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Amanda S. Sen,* Stephanie K. Glaberson,** & Aubrey Rose***
Abstract
This Article seeks to advance due process protections for
people included in state child abuse and neglect registries.
Between states, there are differences in the types of cases included
in the state registry and the process required to be placed on or
removed from the registry. To obtain judicial due process review,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that a protected liberty or property
interest is at stake. When federal courts have evaluated the
individual liberty interest(s) implicated by placement on state
child abuse and neglect registries, they have so far only found
such an interest when the plaintiff’s employment opportunities
were clearly affected. We identify a more principled method by
which courts should evaluate challenges to state child abuse and
neglect registries. Our proposed method would root the analysis
in the core constitutional right of family integrity. We then go on
to identify ways in which states could structure their child abuse
and neglect registries to better comport with due process
requirements.
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I. Introduction
Databases, or “registries,” of individuals who purportedly
pose some danger to the public are becoming increasingly
common.1 Many states maintain lists of people convicted of
certain categories of crimes, including sex crimes, arson, elder
abuse, and methamphetamine-related offenses.2 The federal
government maintains its own databases, including the
classified “No Fly List” that requires airlines to deny access to
flights to listed individuals,3 and widely-available databases
such as the E-Verify program—also referred to as the “No Work
List”—which allows an employer to check whether a job
applicant is authorized to work in the United States.4
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered the due process
rights of an individual whose arrest (not conviction) for
shoplifting was advertised to local businesses in a police flyer.5
The Court determined that harm to reputation, alone, was not
a deprivation of a protected liberty interest and did not warrant
due process protections.6 The Court went on to develop the
“stigma-plus” test to evaluate whether a state action harmed
more than “mere reputation,” and therefore warranted due
process protections.7 Much commentary and scholarship has
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

1. See Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past,
Present, and Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
727, 728 (2013) (“Existing registries are expanding and becoming increasingly
punitive.”).
2. See id. at 738 (“While the most recent wave of registries initially
focused exclusively on sex crimes, the use of registries has begun to expand to
include a number of additional crimes.”).
3. See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735,
1775– 76 (2015) (“The No Fly List maintained the names of individuals that
air carriers were to deny transport.”).
4. See id. at 1763–64 (explaining that the E-Verify system attempts to
“verify” the identity or citizenship status of a worker based upon complex
statistical algorithms and multiple databases).
5. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 693 (1976) (“After [the shoplifting]
charge had been dismissed respondent brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against petitioner police chiefs, who had distributed the flyer to area
merchants, alleging that petitioners’ action under color of law deprived him of
his constitutional rights.”).
6. See id. at 701 (refusing to recognize reputation as a “candidate for
special protection” by the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. See id. at 706 (requiring “an accompanying loss of government
employment” to raise reputation to a protected status).
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criticized the Court’s narrowness in its consideration of liberty
interests in Paul v. Davis8 and subsequent cases.9 Eric J.
Mitnick recently argued that harm to reputation impacts a
person’s privacy and liberty interests.10 Nevertheless, the bar to
identifying a private liberty interest in a procedural due process
claim remains high.11 While Professor Mitnick’s work has been
cited by several litigants, it has not been substantively cited by
a court.12
There is little jurisprudence subsequent to Paul directly
addressing the due process rights of individuals affected by
being listed in the various state registries and databases. The
E-Verify program produces a significant number of errors,
impacting economically disadvantaged prospective workers, but
it has not been subject to a significant due process challenge.13
The Supreme Court heard a procedural due process claim
regarding Connecticut’s sex offender registry in 2003, but the
Court explicitly did not reach the question of whether the
plaintiff was denied a liberty right, ruling that since
Connecticut’s law did not imply continued dangerousness, only
the fact of a conviction, procedural due process analysis was not
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

8. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
9. See Nat Stern, Defamed but Retained Public Employees: Addressing
a Gap in Due Process Jurisprudence, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 797–99 (2003)
(“Paul provoked an avalanche of criticism.”).
10. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm:
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 82 (2009) (accusing the
court of ignoring the notion that constitutional liberty relates to autonomy).
11. See Stern, supra note 9, at 800 (“The principle that the state must
harm more than one’s reputation alone to violate the liberty shielded by due
process is not well-settled.”).
12. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 30, Lucas v. Office of the Colo. State
Pub. Def., 70 F. App’x 700 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1378), 2017 WL 383130, at
*29 (using Mitnick’s article to argue that the State “touched upon” the
petitioner’s constitutional right to pursue intimate human relationships when
it restricted his right to pursue relations with a co-worker). The Supreme
Court of Vermont cited Mitnick’s article, but only to reference the stigma-plus
standard. See Stone v. Town of Irasburg, 196 A.3d 769, 777 (Vt. 2014) (calling
the stigma-plus formulation discussed in Mitnick’s article “widely accepted
today as a constitutional analog to common law defamation”).
13. See Hu, supra note 3, at 1778–83 (2015) (“Experts have concluded
that these factors together create a database screening system that is
unreliable and inaccurate in its structure, both technologically and
programmatically, as well a system that has led to widespread discriminatory
results in its application.”).
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necessary.14 The Eighth Circuit followed this reasoning and
refused a similar due process claim.15 The Sixth Circuit
addressed the question of whether reduced employment
opportunities constituted a deprivation of liberty and concluded,
“[a] charge that merely makes a plaintiff less attractive to other
employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does
not constitute a liberty deprivation.”16
All states maintain child abuse and neglect registries:
centralized databases of people accused of maltreating
children.17 These registries are used to aid child protective
investigations and maintain statistical information for federal
funding.18 They also are used in many states for employment
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

14. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (“We
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because due process
does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the
State’s statutory scheme.”).
15. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (“States ‘are not
barred by principles of “procedural due process” from drawing’ classifications
among sex offenders and other individuals.” (quoting Conn. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 538 U.S. at 8)).
16. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 1994)). Interestingly, in Cutshall,
the court stated, “Cutshall has not cited, and we have not found, any case
recognizing a general right to private employment.” Id. at 479. However, at
least one appellate court, the Second Circuit, had determined prior to Cutshall
that a plaintiff’s liberty interests were disrupted by the state when placement
on a child abuse and neglect registry impacted her private employment
opportunities. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that “Valmonte has adequately stated a cause of action for deprivation of a
liberty interest” as her placement on a child abuse and neglect registry
negatively impacted her employment opportunities). The Cutshall court also
said that “[t]he Constitution does not provide Cutshall with a right to keep his
registry information private, and the Act does not impose any restrictions on
his personal rights that are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such as his procreative or marital rights.” Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 481.
17. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT AND
MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES FOR CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT REPORTS
1 (2018), https://perma.cc/3XAP-GN5R (PDF) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND MAINTENANCE] (“Every State has
procedures for maintaining records related to reports and investigations of
child abuse and neglect. The term ‘central registry’ is used . . . to refer to a
centralized database for the statewide collection and maintenance of child
abuse and neglect investigation records.”).
18. See id. (“Central registries and the systematic record keeping of child
abuse and neglect reports assist child protective services in the identification
and protection of abused and neglected children.”).
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screening in the fields involving the care of children.19 Some
states now operate these registries as online websites, which
grant access to certain employers who submit screening
requests for employees.20 Employers can conduct background
checks on prospective employees and, in some cases, inquire on
a regular basis about current employees.21
Courts have been more willing to consider due process
claims regarding child abuse and neglect registries than other
types of registries, and the Courts of Appeals in both the Second
and Ninth Circuits have ordered states to improve procedural
due process protections for individuals placed on such
registries.22 However, thus far, the courts have couched their
decisions in terms of the impact of registration on the
registrant’s employment rights, which leaves individuals
impacted by child abuse and neglect registries but who are not
employed in an impacted field without a clear claim to equal due
process rights.
Scholars have addressed the challenges of due process in
the child abuse and neglect registry context, but these articles
do not grapple with liberty protections for people whose
employment is not clearly affected by placement on the
registries, and their recommendations for due process
improvements are now dated. In 1993, Michael R. Phillips
argued that as states began opening access to registries to
employers, stronger due process protections would be needed,
and he made several interesting but cursory recommendations
as to how to do so, including robust notice, timing, and
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

19. See id. (“Central registry records also are used to screen persons who
will be entrusted with the care of children.”).
20. See, e.g., Agency Request, DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.-CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVS. INFO. SYSTEM (CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY), https://perma.cc/V2PR-LSST
(last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (allowing certain employers to submit a screening
request to the Georgia Department of Human Services) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i)(A) (McKinney 2019)
(stating that employers are required to inquire while hiring and permitted to
inquire for current employees every six months).
22. See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003–04 (discussing the insufficient due
process protections afforded by the “some credible evidence” standard);
Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1188–90 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing
the insufficient due process protections afforded to individuals placed on
California’s Child Abuse Central Index).
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evidentiary standards.23 Jill D. Moore wrote a fairly exhaustive
overview of jurisprudence on due process and child abuse and
neglect registries in 1995, but she concluded, we believe
prematurely and erroneously, that the cost for individuals
erroneously placed on a registry whose employment is not at
risk is not high enough to be accorded substantial weight.24
More recently, Shaudee Navid argued in the U.C. Davis Law
Review that child abuse and neglect registries are more harmful
to registrants than sex offender registries because registrants’
statuses on the registries are actively provided to employers by
state agencies and some employers are required to check the
registries before making employment decisions.25 Navid took for
granted that the only relevant individual liberty interest to be
considered was rooted in employment opportunities.26
In Part II of this Article, we contend that the protections of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should
not be tied only to an impact on employment. Since the Supreme
Court has recognized parenting to be a fundamental right,27 and
child abuse and neglect registries significantly alter that right,
the “stigma-plus” standard is met and all parents listed on these
registries are entitled to protection.28
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

23. See Michael R. Phillips, Note, The Constitutionality of
Employer-Accessible Child Abuse Registries: Due Process Implications of
Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92 MICH. L. REV. 139, 182–94 (1993)
(arguing how states can apply procedural safeguards to create
employer-accessible child abuse registries that afford protections in
accordance with the Due Process Clause).
24. See Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis:
Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063,
2113–14 (2019) (discussing how courts that view registries as protecting
children who are current victims of neglect and abuse reduce the costs of a
high risk of error as government intrusion into the family is warranted).
25. See Shaudee Navid, They’re Making a List, but Are They Checking It
Twice? How Erroneous Placement on Child Offender Databases Offends Due
Process, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1641, 1659–66 (2011) (arguing “child abuser
databases create everlasting negative and societal effects” as these databases
are disseminated to employers and licensing agencies, unlike sex offender
registries) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) and
Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 999–1001).
26. See id. at 1662–65 (arguing that inclusion on a child abuse registry
forecloses job opportunities, depriving applicable individuals of a liberty
interest).
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See infra Part II.A–C.
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Because all parents listed on these registries must be given
due process protections, in Part III of this Article, we apply the
balancing test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge29 to abuse and
neglect registries.30 We lay out the private interest and the risk
of erroneous deprivation under procedures used by various
states and discuss the states’ interests and burdens.31 We
conclude by proposing best practices under the Mathews v.
Eldridge framework.32
II. Registries and the Challenge of the “Stigma-Plus” Test
A. Abuse and Neglect Registries
All fifty states have registries of people investigated and
deemed potentially responsible for child abuse or neglect.33
Federal law requires states to maintain a central hotline where
the public can make reports of suspected child abuse and
neglect.34 Federal law also requires child protective agencies to
conduct an immediate investigation of these reports and to
promptly determine whether the report is substantiated.35
Outside of these federal guidelines, states establish their
own procedures for agency investigations.36 State statutes often
mandate a brief timeline for investigation. For example, in New
York, the agency must make a determination in sixty days.37
There are not always clear requirements for the brief agency

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

29. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
30. See id. at 335 (describing the three distinct factors to be considered in
analyzing the appropriate due process required).
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See, e.g., John Sherman, Procedural Fairness for State Abuse
Registries: The Case for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 14 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 867, 868 (2011) (“In response to growing awareness of
child abuse in the United States, every state has adopted procedures for
maintaining child abuse and neglect records.”).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2018).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019) (providing an
example of a state establishing its own procedure for agency investigations).
37. See id. § 424(7) (mandating agencies “determine, within sixty days,
whether the report is ‘indicated’ or ‘unfounded’”).
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investigation.38 The agency investigation may simply include an
interview with the child and the suspected parent, or may
include additional interviews with household members,
neighbors,
or
school
professionals.39
During
these
investigations, parents do not have the same protections in their
interactions with child protective agency workers as they would
with law enforcement in a criminal investigation, such as
Miranda rights.40
At the end of the child protective investigation, the agency
will make a preliminary determination about whether there is
enough evidence that the allegations occurred to “substantiate”
the report.41 A few consequences flow from a report being
“substantiated:” first, the agency may decide that intervention
into the family is warranted.42 The agency may do so informally,
offering services or referrals for the family, or the agency may
bring an action in court seeking a court order placing the family
under supervision, mandating participation in services, or,
where the agency deems necessary, removing the child or
children from the care of the parent(s).43 Because the agency
may decide against going to court, many substantiated reports
are never litigated in a court of law.44 Nevertheless, whenever a
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

38.
39.

See, e.g., id. § 424 (lacking a description of steps for investigation).
See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., A PARENT’S GUIDE TO
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY, https://perma.cc/5AMD-L6CT
(PDF) (answering frequently asked questions about Child Protective Service
in New York City).
40. See Donald Dickson, When Law and Ethics Collide: Social Control in
Child Protective Services, 3 ETHICS & SOC. WELFARE 264, 268–69 (2009)
(“[M]any of the constitutional protections available in a criminal setting,
namely the right to a ‘Miranda warning’, the right to counsel, the right to know
one’s accuser, and protections against self-incrimination, among others, are
not automatically available to parents or guardians in civil child abuse
actions.”).
41. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6)(a)–(7) (describing the requirements
of child protective investigations and requiring the resulting report to be
“indicated” or “unfounded” within sixty days).
42. See id. § 424(10)–(13) (outlining possible agency courses of action
when it deems intervention into the family is warranted).
43. See id. (describing potential agency courses of action in detail).
44. See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards & Steven Baron, Alternatives to
Contested Litigation in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 33 FAM. CT. REV. 275,
275 (1995) (“Child abuse and neglect cases are usually resolved without
contested hearings by agreement of the parties.”).
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report is substantiated and regardless of whether the report has
been the subject of a court case, a second consequence also
arises: the agencies must place a copy of any substantiated
report in the child abuse and neglect registry.45
The standards for being listed on and removed from these
registries vary substantially from state to state.46 Perhaps the
most significant differences are the standards for being placed
on the registries.47 Some states, such as New York, require only
“some credible evidence” or “probable cause,” as determined by
a caseworker, to place individuals on the registry.48 About a
third of states require “substantial evidence” or a
“preponderance of the evidence.”49 Some states do not list
individuals on registries until an appeal is unsuccessfully
exhausted50 or until a court has made a finding against the

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

45. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(3) (requiring the agency to
“transmit, forthwith, a copy [of the report] thereof to the state central register
of child abuse and maltreatment”); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6334(g)
(2019) (requiring the department to “maintain a record of the complaint of
suspected child abuse in the Statewide database”).
46. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 3–26 (providing a consolidation of all states’
laws in relation to the establishment and maintenance of central registries for
child abuse or neglect reports).
47. See id. (capturing various state purposes for their respective child
abuse and neglect registries).
48. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(e)(ii)–(v) (McKinney 2019)
(describing the proper protocols if there is or is not “some credible evidence” of
abuse or maltreatment); ALA. CODE § 26-14-8(a) (2019) (stating an “indicated”
report occurs “when credible evidence and professional judgment
substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is responsible for child abuse or
neglect”).
49. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7b-101,7B-311 (2019) (defining
substantial evidence as “relevant evidence a reasonable mind would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-720 (2019)
(stating a case will be entered into the central registry if “the subject of the
report of child abuse or neglect was supported by a preponderance of the
evidence”).
50. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-714(d) (West 2020) (stating an
individual will only be entered into the central registry if found guilty of a
criminal abuse or neglect charge or has been found responsible for the abuse
or neglect and has exhausted his or her appeals or failed to timely file an
appeal); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 616 (2019) (capturing the requirements for
an individual to be placed on the central registry).
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parent or caregiver.51 Other significant differences in state laws
regarding child abuse and neglect registries include who can
access the registry and the procedures and standards to be
removed from the registry.52
Having one’s name on such registries often prevents
individuals from being hired by employers in any field involving
children. In many states, these registries can or must be
accessed by agencies that provide services to children,
particularly childcare.53 Pennsylvania explicitly requires
certain employers to deny an applicant or immediately fire an
employee if there is a founded report in the registry within five
years.54 Other states, such as New York, allow employers to hire
an individual whose name appears in the registry, but require
the employer to generate a written report in the individual’s
employment file stating the specific reasons why the person was
hired despite the indicated report.55
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

51. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019) (requiring a petition for
placement of a perpetrator on the central registry to have a “written case
summary stating facts sufficient to establish [the perpetrator’s abuse or
neglect] by a preponderance of evidence”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257 ( 2019)
(“A name is to be added to the registry only based upon a criminal conviction
or an adjudication by a youth court judge or court of competent jurisdiction,
ordering that the name of the perpetrator be listed on the central registry.”).
52. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 2 (“Who has access to information maintained
in registries and department records also varies among States. In addition,
the length of time the information is held and the condition for expunction
vary from State to State.”).
53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:10a(b)(13) (West 2019) (specifying to
whom and in what situations records of child abuse reports may be released);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.100(3)(b) (2019) (same). Only two states, New York
and Pennsylvania, require employers to check the registry prior to hiring
employees. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(3) (requiring specified employers
to check the registry prior to hiring applicants); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 6344(c)(1) (requiring specified employers to deny applicant
employment if he or she is named in the statewide database). Other states
simply permit access to the registry.
54. See 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6344(c) (requiring specified
employers to deny applicant employment if he or she “is named in the
Statewide database as the perpetrator of a founded report committed within
the five-year period immediately preceding verification”).
55. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(2) (requiring specified employers to
maintain a record “of the specific reasons why such person was determined to
be appropriate” for the applicable role in question).
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Depending on the state statute, child abuse and neglect
registries often provide access to a variety of employers, as long
as the services the employer provides involve any significant
contact with children. Some states maintain a narrow, specific
list of child-care employers who have access to the registry.56
However, many states, like New York, permit broad access to
any employer “who provides goods or services who has the
potential for regular and substantial contact with children.”57 In
these states, individuals whose names appear in the registry
may be precluded from employment in a wide range of
industries beyond childcare, including education, healthcare,
and transportation.58
Employment is not the only aspect of one’s life that can be
affected by being listed on a child abuse and neglect registry. In
all states, including the District of Columbia, a person on the
registry may be disqualified as a kinship foster care or adoptive
parent.59 Child abuse and neglect registry information often is
made available to individuals and entities with an interest in a
specific report, such as reporting physicians, police, judges, and

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

56. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 235A.15(c) (West 2020) (permitting use of
registry for employment screening only at a psychiatric medical institution for
children, child foster care facility, licensed child care facility, school
professionals working with disabled children, state program providing direct
services to children, hospital, early intervention education services, or nursing
program).
57. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i) (outlining inquiries
employers who provide such services or goods must make prior to hiring an
applicant). See also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.627(3) (West 2019)
(permitting access to any employer if employment or volunteer work “will
include contact with children”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (3)(o) (2019)
(permitting access to any employer who “may have unsupervised contact with
children”).
58. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 2019) (requiring
employers to inquire whether any applicant “who provides goods or services
who has the potential for regular and substantial contact with children,” an
inherently broad description, is in the registry).
59. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR
PROSPECTIVE FOSTER, ADOPTIVE AND KINSHIP CAREGIVERS 1 (2016), https://
perma.cc/92MQ-4A8G (PDF) (requiring states, under federal law, to check any
child abuse and neglect registry maintained by the State for information on
prospective foster or adoptive parents and any adult residing in the home).
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court personnel.60 The existence of a report can negatively
impact a parent in custody determinations.61 It can also prevent
parents from volunteering in their children’s schools or
extracurricular programs.62
When conducting investigations, child welfare personnel
routinely check a person’s prior reports on the registry and use
information on the registry about prior investigations to justify
additional state scrutiny of the parent.63 In many states, child
protective agencies also are instituting predictive analytics:
automated prediction tools that use historical data to “score”
children’s risk of future harm.64 Prior substantiated cases or
inclusion in registries may act as one of the “inputs” into these
models, causing families whose names appear on these
registries to have higher “risk scores.”65
Federal statutory law requires minimal due process
procedures for registries for child abuse and neglect.66 The Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires that
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

60. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RECORDS 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/CB8N-UVAZ
(PDF) (“In general, individuals and entities are granted access to a case
because they have a direct interest in the case, direct interest in the child’s
welfare, or have an interest in providing protective or treatment services.”).
61. See infra Part II.C.
62. See infra Part II.C.
63. For example, child protective personnel use prior reports in the
registry to decide whether to refer a new report to law enforcement. See, e.g.,
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a (requiring child protective personnel to consider
contacting local law enforcement if there are two prior reports within six
months). Child protective personnel use prior reports in the registry to make
assessments about whether a child should be removed from their home. See,
e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., SAFETY AND RISK ASSESSMENT
RESOURCE GUIDE 8–9 (2013), https://perma.cc/S9S7-BQ52 (PDF) (instructing
caseworkers to assess whether there has been prior abuse or maltreatment).
64. See, e.g., Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding Over the Cracks: Predictive
Analytics and Child Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 331–36 (2019)
(discussing the use of predictive analytic tools in states’ child protective
efforts).
65. See, e.g., RHEMA VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DATA
ANALYTICS, DEVELOPING PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS TO SUPPORT CHILD
MALTREATMENT HOTLINE SCREENING DECISIONS: ALLEGHENY COUNTY
METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 38 (2017), https://perma.cc/JJV4-VRBS
(PDF) (showing that prior referrals are included as variables in both Allegheny
county’s “placement” and “re-referral” predictive models).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2018) (detailing the provisions and procedures
that states must implement for prevention of child abuse or neglect).
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state applications for federal grants include assurances that the
state has an enforced law that includes procedures for reporting,
responding to, and maintaining records of alleged child abuse
and neglect.67 CAPTA also requires a procedure for removing or
expunging records that are “unsubstantiated or false,” but it
allows even such false records to be retained by and available to
child protective agencies.68
B. Procedural Due Process and the Stigma-Plus Test
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution requires that certain steps must
be taken before the state can deprive a person of rights accorded
to them by the state.69 A state cannot deprive a person of a
liberty or property interest without providing an appropriate
opportunity for review.70 When a plaintiff claims that a state
has violated the Due Process Clause, she first must demonstrate
that she has a liberty or property interest with which the state
has interfered.71 Only then does a court proceed with an analysis
of whether the state provided due process.72 When considering
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

67. See id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B) (requiring numerous assurances for states to
receive grants for their child protection programs).
68. See id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xii) (requiring state protocols “that facilitate
the prompt expungement of any records that are accessible to the general
public or are used for purposes of employment or other background checks in
cases determined to be unsubstantiated or false,” although state child
protective services may keep the information on file). Another provision of
CAPTA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services maintain
a clearinghouse of data and information regarding child abuse and neglect.
See id. § 5104 (establishing a national clearinghouse “for information relating
to child abuse and neglect”). That clearinghouse, the Child Welfare
Information Gateway, provides little to no guidance on state child abuse and
neglect registries. See generally Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://perma.cc/M4W8-U9KA (last visited Jan. 4,
2019) (providing information on child welfare topics) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to afford
individuals due process before depriving them of a property or liberty interest).
70. See id. (requiring an opportunity for review prior to deprivation of a
property or liberty interest).
71. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2009)
(stating that the litigant must show “the conduct violated a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States”).
72. See id. (stating that deprivation of a liberty or property interest is a
threshold a litigant must overcome to have a due process claim).
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the constitutional sufficiency of the procedures states provide
for individuals listed in child maltreatment registries, we
therefore first must consider what liberty or property interests
are at stake, and how they may be infringed by a person’s
inclusion in such a registry.73
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v.
Davis set out the dominant paradigm courts use to
conceptualize the rights infringement wrought by registry
inclusion: the “stigma-plus” test.74 In Paul, the plaintiff brought
a § 1983 action after police distributed a flyer to local merchants
purporting to contain information on “active shoplifters,” which
included the plaintiff’s name and photograph.75 The plaintiff’s
employer discovered his inclusion in the flyer, and although
Paul was not fired, he was instructed that “he ‘had best not find
himself in a similar situation’ in the future.”76 The Court
determined that “the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment apply” only when, “as a result of the state action
complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state
law was distinctly altered or extinguished.”77 The Court
conceived of the rights deprivation caused by being listed on a
registry as a reputational injury.78 Though the Supreme Court
previously had implied that a person’s liberty interests could be

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

73. Compare Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)
(determining “[a] charge that merely makes plaintiff less attractive to other
employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does not constitute
a liberty deprivation”), with Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir.
1994) (determining a plaintiff’s liberty interests were disrupted by the state
when placement on a child abuse and neglect registry impacted her private
employment opportunities).
74. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–13 (1976) (discussing, in detail,
how harm to an individual’s reputation and arising stigma, alone, is
insufficient to constitute deprivation of a liberty or property interest).
75. See id. at 695 (describing the flyer the police distributed, which
displayed the plaintiff’s name and photograph and depicted him as a
shoplifter).
76. Id. at 696.
77. Id. at 711 (emphasis in original).
78. See id. (“But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks
to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the ‘liberty’
or ‘property’ recognized . . . .”).
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implicated when her reputation was at stake,79 in Paul, the
Court made clear that an individual’s “interest in reputation
alone [] is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
recognized [in the Fourteenth Amendment].”80 For this reason,
the Paul Court found that an allegation of pure reputational
injury—without more—does not state a claim under § 1983.81
This holding has become known as the “stigma-plus” test.
Following Paul, courts engage in the process of determining if
the claimed reputational injury—the stigma—is accompanied
by a denial of a “more tangible” interest—the “plus”—when
analyzing claims that implicate one’s reputation rather than
another clear liberty or property interest recognized under state
law.82
Child abuse and neglect registries have been the subject of
due process litigation in several federal courts, though there
have not been a great number of cases.83 When plaintiffs have
brought claims that a state actor violated their due process
rights by placing them on a child abuse and neglect registry,
federal courts have used the “stigma-plus” test to determine if
the alleged harm to reputation rises to a level that implicates
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.84

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

79. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what
the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential.”).
80. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711.
81. See id. at 711–12 (finding reputational injury alone to be insufficient
to state a due process claim).
82. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1185 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 711) (“The Supreme Court clarified that procedural
due process protections apply to reputational harm only when a plaintiff
suffers stigma from governmental actions plus alteration or extinguishment
of ‘a right or status previously recognized by state law.’”).
83. One commentator has speculated that the lack of cases in this area is
due to lack of funds for representation on the part of many potential litigants.
See W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry Statute for Abuse and Neglect
Matters Is Constitutionally Flawed, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 652
(2011) (“It has been my experience that many of the litigants are not
sufficiently funded to retain counsel. For these reasons, these cases do not
ordinarily find their way to the appellate courts.”).
84. See, e.g., Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1185 (citing Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006)) (applying the “stigma-plus test”).
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When the plaintiff’s inclusion on the registry has had
consequences for his or her employment, federal appellate
courts, including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, have
found those plaintiffs to have demonstrated harm to a liberty
interest and that the Due Process Clause was implicated.85 For
example, Humphries v. County of Los Angeles86 involved a
challenge brought to a California registry in which the state law
and county practice failed to provide any mechanism to allow
listed individuals to challenge the placement of their name on
the registry.87 The plaintiffs were parents accused of abuse who
were determined to be factually innocent by a court, but could
not cause their names to be removed from the child abuse and
neglect registry.88 The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims met
the “stigma-plus” standard because placement on the state
registry altered their rights due to the impact on employment
opportunities.89
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

85. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that defamation in conjunction with a statutory impediment to employment
constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493,
503 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that findings of abuse or neglect against a child
care worker which effectively bar that person from future employment in the
child care field “squarely implicate a protected liberty interest”); Humphries,
554 F.3d at 1185 (identifying being listed on California’s Child Abuse Central
Index (CACI) as a deprivation of a liberty interest that implicates due process).
86. 554 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. See id. at 1182 (describing the Humphries’ discovery that there was
no available procedure to challenge the CACI listing).
88. See id. at 1175 (offering factual history of the Humphries’ case).
89. See id. at 1188 (internal citations omitted)
The Humphries allege more than mere reputational harm—being
listed on the CACI alters their rights in two general ways. First,
state statutes mandate that licensing agencies search the CACI and
conduct an additional investigation prior to granting a number of
rights and benefits. These rights include gaining approval to care
for children in a day care center or home, obtaining a license or
employment in child care, volunteering in a crisis nursery, receiving
placement or custody of a relative’s child, or qualifying as a resource
family. These benefits are explicitly conditioned on the agency
checking the CACI and conducting an additional investigation.
Second, information in the CACI is specifically made available to
other identified agencies: state contracted licensing agencies
overseeing employment positions dealing with children; persons
making pre-employment investigations for “peace officers, child
care licensing or employment, adoption, or child placement;”
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In Valmonte v. Bane,90 the Second Circuit evaluated the
case of a plaintiff whose employment opportunities were
impacted by being on the New York State child abuse and
neglect registry.91 At that time in New York, an individual had
a right to ask for expungement of the record and a hearing at
which the state had to “prove to the commissioner the
allegations against the subject by some credible evidence, and
then prove that the allegations are reasonably related to
employment in the child care field.”92 The Second Circuit found,
as the Ninth Circuit later did in Humphries, that the
requirement that some employers check the registry met the
“stigma-plus” standard.93 The court stated, “[i]n other words, by
operation of law, her potential employers will be informed
specifically about her inclusion on the Central Register and will
therefore choose not to hire her. Moreover, if they do wish to hire
her, those employers are required by law to explain the reasons
why in writing.”94 The Seventh Circuit came to an almost
identical conclusion in Dupuy v. Samuels.95
Not all courts have found potential impacts on employment
opportunities to be adequate to implicate a liberty interest
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

individuals in the Court Appointed Special Advocate program
conducting background investigations for potential Court
Appointed Special Advocates, and out-of-state agencies making
foster care or adoptive decisions.
90. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 994.
92. Id. at 996 (internal citations omitted).
93. See id. at 1001 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
When the Supreme Court stated in Paul v. Davis that injury to
reputation was not by itself a deprivation of a liberty interest, we
presume that the Court included the normal repercussions of a poor
reputation within that characterization. . . . Valmonte is not going
to be refused employment because of her reputation; she will be
refused employment simply because her inclusion on the list results
in an added burden on employers who will therefore be reluctant to
hire her.
94. Id. at 1001 (emphasis in original).
95. See Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The district
court concluded that child care workers effectively are barred from future
employment in the child care field once an indicated finding of child abuse or
neglect against them is disclosed to . . . licensing agencies and present or
prospective employers. Such circumstances squarely implicate a protected
liberty interest.”).
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requiring the provision of due process.96 Some courts, including
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit appellate courts, have dismissed
claims for lack of a specific, concrete injury to the plaintiff’s
liberty interests.97 In Hodge v. Jones,98 the Fourth Circuit
dismissed a claim, specifically noting that the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate any direct impact on their family life or on their
employment as a result of their investigation.99 Notably, in
Hodge, the plaintiffs were not placed on a registry—they sought
to have the investigative report itself expunged.100 The Eleventh
Circuit also found in Smith v. Siegelman101 that the
plaintiff-registrant had not demonstrated that state action had
implicated a liberty interest sufficient to meet the stigma-plus
standard,102 going so far as to say that “the deleterious effects
that flow directly from a sullied reputation, such as the adverse
impact on job prospects, are normally insufficient [to
demonstrate a protected liberty interest].”103

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

96. See, e.g., Glasford v. New York Dep’t Soc. Servs., 787 F. Supp. 384,
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the plaintiff did not allege a harm to his
employment prospects from being placed on a child abuse and neglect
registry). The court ruled that he did not demonstrate a harm to his liberty or
property interests. Id. at 387–89.
97. See, e.g., Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 1994) (identifying
only a conclusory allegation of a reputational injury and no accompanying
deprivation of a tangible interest); Smith v. Siegelman 322 F.3d 1290, 1297
(11th Cir. 2003) (“We agree that Smith’s employment and custody rights in
the future could be affected adversely due to the information on the Registry,
but the district court’s conjecture overlooks Paul’s insistence that reputational
damage alone is insufficient to constitute a protected liberty interest.”).
98. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994).
99. Id. at 164–65.
100. See id. at 162 (identifying the basis of the Hodges’ action); see also
Howard v. Malac, 270 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141–42 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that
plaintiffs were placed on a child abuse and neglect registry). The court cited
Hodge and Glasford to find that the plaintiffs had not met the stigma-plus
standard because they had not demonstrated an injury beyond that to their
reputation. Id.
101. 322 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
102. See id. at 1297–98 (“The complaint does not at any point allege that
Smith was denied any right or status other than his not being branded a child
sexual abuser.”).
103. Id. (citing Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)).
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C. Parenting as a Right

As described above, in order for a court to reach the merits
of a due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
state has interfered with a protected interest. That qualifying
injury must be to a right given by the state, including
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution.104 The
Supreme Court required in Paul v. Davis that a plaintiff must
demonstrate more than “merely” an injury to his or her
reputation, and courts have tended to focus on that standard as
they have evaluated whether a plaintiff demonstrated an injury
to a protected interest in the context of child abuse and neglect
registries.105 We contend that since parenting has been
recognized by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right that
states must protect, and child abuse and neglect registries
significantly alter that right, all parents listed on these
registries should be entitled to the protections of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Especially as the
use of historical data to guide agency action multiplies in the
form of predictive analytics, this argument takes on
considerable force.106
Privacy interests, long recognized by the Supreme Court as
fundamental liberty interests, though not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution,107 take two forms: “interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters [and] interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”108 Here, we focus on the latter—“interest of
independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”109

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

104. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–14 (1976) (discussing the
scope of rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 310 (discussing increased use of
predictive analytics).
107. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (identifying a right of privacy that is “older than the Bill of
Rights”).
108. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
109. Id.

INADEQUATE PROTECTION

877

In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,110 the Supreme Court
established the principle that parents have a constitutional
right to direct the upbringing and education of their children
absent a compelling state reason to the contrary.111 Later cases
clarified and elaborated on that principle. In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,112 the Court said, “[c]hoices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is
central to our constitutional scheme.”113 In a substantive due
process analysis in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,114 the
Supreme Court made very clear that the liberty rights of a
family were significant enough to require a state to fully justify
any infringement on those rights.115 The Court cited Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur116 to say, “[t]his Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”117 The

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

110. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
111. See id. at 534–35
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control. As often
heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
112. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
113. Id. at 617–18.
114. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
115. See id. at 499 (“[W]hen the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation.”).
116. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
117. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639–40).
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Court specifically noted that the right of extended families’
members to reside with each other was significant.118
The Supreme Court has, in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality & Reform,119 noted that familial liberty
interests are rooted in “intrinsic human rights,” and are not
limited in the way that liberty interests derived from state law
might be limited by state law.120 Evaluating due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cites a long
history of cases highlighting the importance of the liberty
interests in marriage and family, including Wisconsin v.
Yoder121 and Griswold v. Connecticut,122 concluding that
“natural” family relationships must be accorded greater
protection than rights derived from contractual relationships
with the state.123
There are, of course, limitations on liberty rights in
parenting and family life. As noted by the First Circuit, “The
right to family integrity clearly does not include a constitutional
right to be free from child abuse investigations.”124 Those
limitations, however, are accompanied by an emphasis on the
importance of procedural due process. This is illustrated in, for
example, Santosky v. Kramer,125 in which the Supreme Court
held that an entity or person petitioning for termination of
parental rights must prove the case by “clear and convincing”
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

118. See id. at 504 (“The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”).
119. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
120. Id. at 845.
121. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
122. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846–47
It is quite another [matter] to say that one may acquire [a liberty]
interest in the face of another’s constitutionally recognized liberty
interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction,
and basic human right—an interest the foster parent has
recognized by contract from the outset. Whatever liberty interest
might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that
interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural
parents.
124. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
125. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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evidence, which is a higher standard than the “preponderance
of the evidence” standard that applies in most civil cases.126
It is not necessary for the state to completely extinguish a
right in order for a court to find infringement. For example, in
Humphries, the plaintiffs did not show they had been completely
barred from employment—they demonstrated that their
employment and volunteering would become more difficult
because of their inclusion on the registry.127
The harm caused by inclusion in registries, regardless of
employment consequences, is omnipresent. Parents who are
placed on child abuse and neglect registries face a significant
increase in scrutiny from child welfare workers. Placement on a
child abuse and neglect registry also impacts custody decisions.
Such placement can also impede parents’ ability to volunteer in
the activities in which their children participate, as well as
affect an individual’s ability to act as a foster parent.128
With the advent of predictive analytics in child welfare, the
ways in which registry placement might impact a government
agency’s approach to a parent or family has become more
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

126. See id. at 769 (considering precedent for the applicable burden of
proof).
127. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2009)
We recognize that being listed on the CACI may not fully extinguish
the Humphries’ rights or status. Agencies that obtain information
from the CACI are responsible for “drawing independent
conclusions
regarding
the
quality
of
the
evidence
disclosed.” . . . However, we need not find that an agency will
necessarily deny the Humphries a license to satisfy the “plus” test.
Outright denial would mean that a listing on the CACI has
extinguished the Humphries’ legal right or status. Rather, Paul
provides that stigma-plus applies when a right or status is “altered
or extinguished.”
(internal citations omitted). In other contexts, courts have said that a right
must be completely extinguished. Compare Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d
1293 (D. Or. 2013) (finding a liberty interest in the right to fly), with Beydoun
v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that the liberty interest found
in Latif v. Holder did not apply when the plaintiff was not completely banned
from flying).
128. The impact of registry placement on individual’s ability to serve as
foster and kinship care placements is significant and merits its own
discussion. It is, however, beyond the scope of the argument of this Article. See
generally Courtney Lewis, Placing Children with Relatives: The Case for a
Clear Rationale for Separate Foster Care Licensing Standards, Background
Check Procedures, and Improved Relative Placement Statutes in Alaska, 34
ALASKA L. REV. 161 (2017).
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pervasive and more pernicious.129 Once, a child welfare worker
might have received information showing that the family
previously had been referred to the agency, or that the parent’s
name was listed on the statewide registry, and develop an
opinion of the family as a result. Now that information is being
fed into statistical, predictive models that spit out purported
“risk scores” that may severely—yet opaquely—impact the
course of a family’s interaction with the agency.
The fact that registry information may be included as an
input into these tools raises the stakes for ensuring that
information included in state registries is as accurate, fair, and
relevant as possible.130 Where reports remain on state registries
despite inaccuracies, or as a result of mere procedural barriers,
they infect these tools—and the decisions that agencies make in
reliance on their results—with further error and unfairness.
Placement on a child abuse and neglect registry impacts a
parent’s ability to participate in her children’s lives. Placement
on a registry can prevent parents from coaching their children’s
sports teams.131 It can also prevent parents from volunteering
in their children’s schools.132 In Washington, Heather
Cantamessa found that her placement on the registry prevented
her from volunteering in the classroom or on field trips, and
volunteering was a requirement of the special public-school
program in which she had enrolled her children.133 A school in
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

129. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 310 (discussing the risks of human
error ingrained in predictive analytics).
130. See id. (“Unless careful attention is paid to the assumptions, biases
and realities of our child welfare system at this critical juncture, algorithmic
decision-making risks perpetuating and magnifying existing problems.”).
131. See Email from David Lansner, Partner, Lansner & Kubitschek, to
author (July 17, 2019, 5:30 PM EST) (describing a client who could not coach
his daughter’s baseball team because of a report) (on file with author); Email
from Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr., to author (July 18, 2019,
10:24 AM EST) (reflecting on cases involving parents who served as volunteer
coaches) (on file with author).
132. See Email from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie E. Saltzman,
LLC, to author (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (describing an experience with
one client prohibited from volunteering at his child’s school) (on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr.
(Dec. 14, 2018).
133. Email from Heather Cantamessa, Parent Support Social Servs.
Worker, to author (July 18, 2019, 12:22 AM EST) (on file with author).
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Illinois banned a parent from entering her child’s school because
she had been briefly placed on the registry before a successful
appeal.134 Even when parents have not been officially rejected
from volunteering, the fear that their placement on the registry
might be discovered by people they know can be overwhelming
and prevent them from participating.135
Placement on the registry can also have significant impacts
for parents who are in court for custody determinations. An
attorney in Arizona described opposing parents using the
registry “as a cudgel in custody battles.”136 Carolyn Kubitschek,
an attorney in New York, says that clients she represents in
child custody cases are sometimes surprised to find that they
are listed in New York’s child abuse and neglect registry.137
When that happens, the client may be able to contest the finding
and placement on the registry.138 However, the process of
clearing one’s name can take six months or more, and the
custody case will not be stayed while the parent seeks to clear
his or her name.139 Since a parent who is listed on the registry
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Ambrosia Eberhardt had a similar experience. See Email from Ambrosia
Eberhardt, Program Manager, Parents for Parents, to author (July 23, 2019,
7:07 AM EST) (on file with author). The state of Washington explicitly forbids
people who are listed on the state child abuse and neglect registry from
volunteering in schools. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.400.303 (2020) (requiring
a record check through the Washington state patrol criminal identification
system and the FBI before hire); see also Email from Amelia S. Watson,
Parents Representation Managing Attorney, Wash. State Office of Pub. Def.,
to Stephanie Glaberson, Staff Attorney, Civil Litig. Clinic, Georgetown Univ.
School of Law (Mar. 12, 2019, 07:50 PM EST) (discussing Washington’s
permanent bar from volunteering at a child’s school) (on file with author).
134. Telephone Interview with Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr.
(Dec. 14, 2018).
135. See Hope Lyzette Newton, Branded, RETHINKING FOSTER CARE (July
5, 2019), https://perma.cc/9NDM-FWVX (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (describing
ways in which the author feared participating in her family’s activities and
lives because of her inclusion on New York’s State Central Registry, a status
she later successfully appealed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
136. Mary Jo Pitzl, DCS Lists People It Says Are a Danger to Kids. Even
When They’re Not, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/6M52-LZF6
(last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. Telephone Interview with Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Partner, Lansner
& Kubitschek (Dec. 21, 2018).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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is at a serious disadvantage in a custody case, placement on the
registry can have serious long-term impacts on their custody
and visitation rights.140 Even if the parent eventually succeeds
in clearing his or her name, the negative custody or visitation
order may already have been issued.141
III. Achieving Procedural Due Process
If a plaintiff convinces a court that she has a protected
liberty interest that has been significantly altered by the state,
thus meeting the stigma-plus standard, the court goes on to
evaluate the due process claim on the merits.142 In the child
abuse and neglect registry cases that have gotten to this point
in federal appellate courts, the courts have found several states’
procedures constitutionally insufficient.143 In Valmonte v. Bane,
for example, the Second Circuit found that the “staggering
figure” of roughly 2,000,000 individuals listed on New York’s
Central Register, combined with statistics showing that
approximately seventy-five percent of those who were able to
challenge their inclusion in the registry were successful, showed
that there was an “unacceptably high risk of error.”144 The court
attributed this risk of error to the low standard of proof required
before a person’s name was listed, stating that “[t]he crux of the
problem with the procedures is that the ‘some credible evidence’
standard results in many individuals being placed on the list
who do not belong there.”145 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found
in Humphries that the risk of erroneous deprivation under
California’s scheme was “perhaps the most important” factor to
consider, and that California’s procedures resulted in it being
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (framing the existence of
a liberty interest as the threshold issue in a due process violation claim).
143. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that California’s maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493,
508– 09 (7th Cir. 2005) (ratifying the district court’s proposed remedy, which
added more steps to the pre- and post-deprivation processes); Valmonte v.
Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the procedural protections
established by New York are unsatisfactory).
144. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004.
145. Id.

INADEQUATE PROTECTION

883

“quite likely” that a person would end up “erroneously listed.”146
As a result, the Court held that the “lack of any meaningful,
guaranteed procedural safeguards before the initial placement”
on the registry, “combined with the lack of any effective process
for removal from” the registry constituted a due process
violation.147 The respondent states made changes in their
practices in response to those court decisions,148 but more
changes are required to ensure that all state processes and
procedures fully comply with the Due Process Clause.
In this Part, we will lay out due process standards and
considerations in the child welfare context. We will then use
case law and findings from comparing the laws, practices, and
outcomes in states across the country to suggest best practices
to maximize due process under Mathews v. Eldridge.
A. Balancing Act
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Standard
Once a right to a due process analysis has been identified,
courts evaluate the claim by using the balancing test laid out in
Mathews v. Eldridge. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, a due process
analysis requires a court to consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.149

2. Weighing Abuse and Neglect Registries’ Processes
There are high stakes in child welfare actions and listing
individuals in child abuse and neglect registries is no exception.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

146. Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1194.
147. Id. at 1200.
148. See, e.g., A.B. 717, 2011 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (codified
at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.12, 11169, 11170 (Deering 2019)) (applying
provisions of the code only to abuse reports that are substantiated). Prior to
the bill’s enactment, the standard was any report “not unfounded.” Id.
149. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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Jill D. Moore lays out some of these considerations when she
says:
When a state chooses to place an individual’s name on a child
maltreatment central registry, it is taking an action that
potentially could affect that individual’s family life, his
employment prospects, or even his reputation in the
community, if registry information becomes known to the
public. That same action, however, may further any one of
three interests that the state may have, including: (1) an
interest in maintaining data that could help it to identify
children who are being abused or neglected over an extended
period of time; (2) an interest in maintaining data about child
maltreatment in the state generally, for the purposes of
research, policy-making, or funding decisions; or (3) an
interest in establishing a database of individuals who,
because of their history of maltreating children, should not
be provided opportunities—employment or otherwise—to
obtain unsupervised access to children. 150

Some courts and scholars have concluded that little needs
to change,151 but advocates vehemently disagree, and the large
degree of difference in procedures across state lines speaks to
the fact that there is no consensus on what procedures would
best serve due process.152

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

150. Moore, supra note 24, at 2111–12 (internal citations omitted).
151. See, e.g., Bohn v. Cty. of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1438–39 (8th Cir.
1985)
[T]he ex post procedures for review are fully adequate to test the
veracity of the County Department’s finding in that these
procedures substantially incorporate truth-testing measures long
approved by our legal system. . . . In addition, we believe that the
interjection of fuller procedural protections at an earlier state in the
process would be unduly time-consuming and cumbersome, and
might well reduce important protections which the state legislature
designed for otherwise vulnerable children.
See also Sherman, supra note 33, at 894 (“[U]nder the current decisions, the
Federal Due Process Clause can only be relied upon to require a
preponderance of the evidence standard in abuse registry cases . . . .”).
152. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUM. SERVS., ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES
FOR CHILD ABUSE REPORTS: STATE STATUTES (2018), https://perma.cc
/S76Q-PCJ3 (PDF).
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a. Private Interests
Placement on a child abuse and neglect registry can have
significant impacts on individuals. As laid out above, being
placed on a child abuse and neglect registry can increase the
intensity of any future interactions with the child welfare
system, impede involvement in children’s activities and
schooling, and impact child custody and visitation orders.
Beyond the implications for parenting, inclusion on child
abuse and neglect registries can have serious employment
consequences. Many states make registrants’ names available
to organizations whose employees may have any potential
contact with children, even in a limited capacity.153 For example,
a public records request revealed that the New York Statewide
Central Registry provides access to over 5,000 employers in a
wide range of industries beyond traditional childcare, including
home-health aid agencies and transportation services.154 This
impacts not just teachers and daycare workers, but also people
who work in any capacity in large agencies, such as hospitals
and police departments.155 Employers are extremely reluctant
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

153. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (3)(o) (2019) (permitting access
to any employer whose employees “may have unsupervised contact with
children through employment”); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a (McKinney 2019)
(permitting access to organizations with “the potential for regular and
substantial contact with children”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-506 (West 2019)
(permitting access to employers “engaged in child-related activities”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-185 (West 2019) (permitting access to employers whose
employees “interact with children or are responsible for providing care for
children”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.100 (2019) (permitting access to
organizations whose employees “could, in the course of his or her employment,
have regular and substantial contact with children”); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-3-214 (West 2019) (permitting access to organizations whose employees
“may have unsupervised access to children in course of their employment”).
154. See NEW YORK OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, LIST OF
ENTITIES AUTHORIZED TO SUBMIT CLEARANCES TO OCFS’ STATEWIDE CENTRAL
REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT, OCFS FOIL #18-101 (2018) (on
file with author).
155. See, e.g., ABIGAIL KRAMER, THE NEW SCHOOL CENTER FOR NEW YORK
CITY AFFAIRS, BANNED FOR 28 YEARS: HOW CHILD WELFARE ACCUSATIONS KEEP
WOMEN OUT OF THE WORKFORCE 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/82Y4-58M7 (PDF)
(providing an anecdote from a healthcare worker who was placed on New
York’s registry); Email from Amelia Watson, Parents Representation
Managing Attorney, Washington State Office of Public Defense, to author
(July 23, 2019, 2:17 PM EST) (on file with author) (stating that being listed on
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to hire individuals who are on the registry, more so, some say,
than individuals with a minor criminal history.156 In many
jurisdictions, parents can lose jobs even when a court has
dismissed their child abuse or neglect case because, in most
states, the registry is not coordinated with family court
decisions.157
The right to greater family association is also impacted by
inclusion on child abuse and neglect registries.158 Individuals on
registries are precluded from serving as foster parents and very
often are not approved to provide kinship care to their own
family members.159 CAPTA requires that foster care agencies
conduct a criminal record check and a check of the child abuse
and neglect registry for all prospective foster and adoptive
parents.160 Though it does not require a criminal record check
for all residents of a prospective adoptive household, CAPTA
does require that all adult residents in a prospective foster or
kinship home be checked for inclusion in the child abuse or
neglect registry in order to qualify for federal kinship care
funding.161

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

the registry in the state of Washington prevents employment in many health
care fields, among other obstacles).
156. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 4 (noting the recently enacted laws
which make it illegal for employers to ask about an applicant’s criminal
history).
157. See infra Part III.B.4.c; see also Nikita Stewart, The Child Abuse
Charge Was Dismissed. But It Can Still Cost You a Job., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25,
2019), https://perma.cc/3QRK-25MV (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (“[M]any state
databases keep names on the lists even after people are cleared of
allegations.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 1–4 (listing the bases upon which a state may
deny a prospective foster parent, adoptive parent, or kinship giver).
159. See id. at 3–4 (providing that all states “require checks of the [state’s]
child abuse and neglect registries” as part of the review process and the
applicant’s name on a child abuse registry is a basis for disqualification in all
states).
160. See Howard Davidson, The CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010: What
Advocates Should Know, 29 CHILD. L. PRAC. 177, 182 (2011) (explaining the
CAPTA background check requirements).
161. See id. at 182 (noting the background check requirements for the
applicants and those living in the residence).
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b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
As will be discussed below, low evidentiary standards,
imprecise requirements for placement on child abuse and
neglect registries, limited time frames for challenging hearing
placement, problems with notice, and challenges for pro se
parents at hearings create a high risk for erroneous deprivation
of rights. Currently, a very high number of individuals who seek
removal of their report from the registry are ultimately
successful at overturning their report.162 State courts have
found “a disturbingly high” reversal rate, even as high as
seventy-five percent.163 Recent data collected from state
agencies suggests that appellants continue to have an over fifty
percent reversal rate.164 This high error rate is still woefully
incomplete because many people face barriers to requesting an
appeal in the first place. For example, for the estimated 50,000
people added to the registry in 2017 in New York, the State
received fewer than 9,300 requests for removal.165 From the
existing data and the barriers to litigation, it is clear that a high
risk of erroneous deprivation exists across jurisdictions today.166
c. State Interests
As the Supreme Court noted in the context of termination
of parental rights proceedings in Santosky v. Kramer, “[t]wo
state interests are at stake” when dealing with state
interference in parental rights: “[A] parens patriae interest in
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

162. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (stating
that the margin of error in adding an individual to the registry is
“unquestionably significant”).
163. Id.; see also Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Mo.
2007) (citing to evidence that Missouri’s Child Abuse and Neglect Review
Board reverses the local agency’s “probable cause determination[s] somewhere
in the vicinity of 35–40% of the time”).
164. NEW YORK OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, RESPONSE TO
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW REQUEST REGARDING OCFS’ STATEWIDE
CENTRAL REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT, OCFS FOIL #18-101
(2018) (on file with author); GA. DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
OPEN RECORD REQUEST REGARDING GEORGIA CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
INFORMATION SYSTEM (2018) (on file with author).
165. KRAMER, supra note 155, at 6.
166. See id. at 5–6 (explaining the numerous barriers that individuals face
in seeking to remove their report from the registry).
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preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal
and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of
such proceedings.”167 These interests are at times conflicting
and at times convergent.168
Similar conditions are present in the state’s adjudication of
public benefits issues.169 In Goldberg v. Kelly,170 the Supreme
Court observed that the state has an interest in avoiding
erroneous denials of public assistance.171 Noting that, “[f]rom its
founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the
dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders,” the
Goldberg Court found that ensuring uninterrupted public
assistance until such time as an adjudication that comports with
due process can occur serves the state’s interest.172 The Court
found that the state’s interest in allowing the poor to participate
meaningfully in community life protects against societal
malaise, and that this interest, coupled with a strong private
interest, “clearly outweigh[ed]” the state’s competing fiscal
concern.173
Ultimately, state interests are served by ensuring the most
accurate results in its adjudications of listings on child abuse
and neglect registries because of the state’s “urgent interest in
the welfare of the child.”174
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

167. Id. at 766.
168. See id. at 766–67 (discussing the interplay between the two interests).
169. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (summarizing the
two state interests implicated in public benefits issues: ensuring that welfare
benefits are conferred to individuals eligible to receive them and the state’s
interest in “conserving fiscal and administrative resources”).
170. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
171. See id. at 264 (“[I]mportant governmental interests are promoted by
affording recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.”).
172. See id. at 264–65 (explaining that due process is essential to the
government’s interest in “uninterrupted provision [of welfare] to those eligible
to receive it”).
173. See id. at 266 (“[T]he interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted
receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State’s interest that his
payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State’s
competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative
burdens.”).
174. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (“Since the
State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s
interest in an accurate and just decision.”).
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Allowing that reducing the cost and burden of proceedings
is a state interest, though perhaps not as important as ensuring
accurate decisions, looking to the laws that states have already
enacted can provide insight into what practices improve
accuracy without substantially increasing the burden on the
state. Our survey of the laws of all fifty states revealed a wide
variety of practices. The different state laws provide concrete
examples of different ways that a state can articulate and
protect its interests, including both parens patriae interests and
fiscal interests in minimizing unnecessary process. They are
evidence that rigorous due process protections are possible.
B. Due Process Best Practices
Due process protections can and should be clearer and more
robust across the United States for persons included in child
abuse or neglect registries. The following is a list of suggested
procedures, drawn from best practices across all fifty states. For
each procedural protection, this Article will analyze the
Mathews v. Eldridge factors. Since the private interest has been
discussed above, this section will focus on: 1) the risk of
erroneous deprivation with the procedure currently used and
the probable value of the additional procedural safeguard, and
2) the state’s interest, including the administrative and fiscal
burden.
To create the following recommendations regarding best
practices, we compiled laws and regulations from all fifty states
regarding child abuse and neglect registries. We requested data
through states’ freedom of information acts from states where
data might be illuminating, and we spoke with practitioners
from many states. We offer a starting point from which
legislators, courts, practitioners and activists can, in their own
states, make improvements to their states’ registries. This list
is not exhaustive. We do not, for example, make
recommendations regarding employer access to registry
information, as that is outside the scope of this Article. Some
states have taken great steps toward providing procedural
protections to parents on the registry.175 Those states should
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

175. See Nicholas E. Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach
Hansen, The Standard of Proof in the Substantiation of Child Abuse and
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continue to implement those provisions and look to other states
to see how their statutes can be refined and improved.
1. Initial Placement on the Registry
The first key point in the registry process is the decision to
place an individual on the registry.176 When a call is made to the
state’s central hotline, a hotline worker typically forwards the
report to the local child protective agency for investigation.177 A
child protective investigator is assigned to the case to both
collect evidence and serve as the decisionmaker as to whether
abuse or neglect occurred.178 The child protective investigator
conducts a brief investigation, which may consist of a single
interview with the child and the parent, or include additional
interviews with household members, neighbors or school and
medical professionals.179
After gathering evidence, the child protective investigator
must decide whether to mark the case “substantiated” or “not
substantiated.”180 Different states use different terms, such as
“indicated”181 or “founded,”182 but this Article will use
“substantiated” generally to include those terms. Some states
have a third category, which allows child protective
investigators to classify reports as “inconclusive” or
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Neglect, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 341–50 (2017) (summarizing the
efforts of five states to heighten the standard of proof required to substantiate
a claim of child abuse).
176. See Stewart, supra note 157 (describing the effect of an individual’s
name on the registry).
177. See, e.g., A PARENT’S GUIDE TO CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW
YORK CITY, supra note 39 (explaining that calls are first received at the state
level and then forwarded to the local agency).
178. See, e.g., id. (detailing the investigative process and the investigator’s
decision-making authority).
179. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the investigator will speak with
members of the household and may also speak with teachers, neighbors, and
health care providers).
180. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.47.602 (2019) (defining the investigating
worker’s conclusion that a danger to the child may exist as a “substantiated
report”).
181. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. L. § 424-a (McKinney 2019) (using
“indicated”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303 (2019) (using “indicated”).
182. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1505 (2019) (stating that the
investigation results in a determination of “founded” or “unfounded”).
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“undetermined” if there is not enough evidence of abuse or
neglect to make a clear determination.183 Child protection
investigators must write a brief explanation of the outcome of
their investigation in the record.184 According to practitioners,
the explanation of a substantiated case is rarely more than a
few sentences long.185
There are two main purposes behind an agency’s
preliminary decision to substantiate a case of child abuse or
neglect.186 First, substantiation is generally necessary before
the agency pursues court intervention, such as a judicial finding
of abuse or neglect against the parent or placement in foster
care,187 though the vast majority of child welfare cases are never
brought to court.188 Second, in most states, child protective
agencies are required to substantiate a case before providing

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.02 (2020) (“Inconclusive report means a
report . . . which cannot be proven to be substantiated or unfounded.”); 325
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2019) (“‘An undetermined report’ means any report made
under this Act in which it was not possible to initiate or complete an
investigation on the basis of information provided to the Department.”); MONT.
ADMIN. R. 37.47.602 (2019) (stating that a “substantiated report” is based on a
preponderance of evidence but a “founded report” is based only on probable
cause); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12 (West 2019) (“Inconclusive report means
a report that is determined by the investigator . . . not to be unfounded, but
the findings are inconclusive and there is insufficient evidence to determine
whether child abuse or neglect . . . has occurred.”).
184. See E-mail from Janet F. Ginzberg, Senior Staff Attorney, Cmty.
Legal Servs., to author (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:23 EST) (stating that “[i]nvestigators
write up investigation summaries in their files” and “put their conclusions on
a form called a CY-48, which is sent in to the child abuse registry”) (on file
with author).
185. See id. (estimating that the investigators’ written summaries are “an
average of 2 or 3 sentences”); see also E-mail from Diana Rugh Johnson, Child
Welfare Law Specialist, Diana Rugh Johnson, PC, to author (Mar. 13, 2019,
11:54 EST) (noting that the summary “is a very short blurb,” akin to a tweet)
(on file with author).
186. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 335 (summarizing the two
purposes).
187. See id. (“Substantiation is generally a prerequisite to pursuing a
judicial finding of abuse or neglect and an order placing a child in foster care.”).
188. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 2 (explaining that most individuals
on the New York registry are on it because of neglect and were never notified
of a court proceeding against them).
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services to the family.189 However, child protective agencies
have tools at their disposal to keep children safe without
substantiating a case against a parent.190 Many agencies now
employ a differential response model in low- to moderate-risk
cases, wherein they provide services to families without making
a substantiation decision.191 Services can include a wide range
of resources, such as emergency financial assistance for housing
and food, daycare, and home-based family services.192 Studies
suggest that agencies following these practices are just as
successful at keeping children safe and may even be more
effective in child protection.193
Child protective workers typically submit a report on their
investigation to the state child abuse and neglect registry
shortly after receipt of the initial report or substantiation.194
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

189. See id. at 335 (“In most states, the substantiation of abuse or neglect
is required before child welfare services can be provided, even if those services
work toward preserving the family and not removal of a child to foster care.”).
190. See Patricia L. Kohl, Melissa Jonson-Reid & Brett Drake, Time to
Leave Substantiation Behind: Findings from a National Probability Study, 14
CHILD MALTREATMENT 17, 18 (2009) (explaining that data indicate that more
children of unsubstantiated claims received services than children of
substantiated claims).
191. See id. (“Some states using an ‘alternative response’ or ‘two-track’
system do not even attempt to apply the substantiated/unsubstantiated
distinction to apparently less serious cases.” (citation omitted)).
192. See Christine H. Kim, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable
Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
287, 291 (1999) (listing the services that a state agency may offer to abused
and neglected children and their families).
193. See, e.g., JOANNE RUPPEL, YUFAN HUANG & GAIL HAULENBEEK, N.Y.
STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD
PROTECTION SERVICES IN NEW YORK STATE: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE 103 (2011), https://perma.cc/WU9Q-ZPRQ (PDF) (summarizing
the success of an alternative response to child abuse and neglect cases in the
state of New York).
194. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019)
Each child protective service shall . . . upon the receipt of each
written report . . . transmit, forthwith, a copy thereof to the state
central register of child abuse and maltreatment. In addition, not
later than seven days after receipt of the initial report, the child
protective service shall send a preliminary written report of the
initial investigation, including evaluation and actions taken or
contemplated, to the state central register.
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-182 (West 2019)
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The state registry is typically maintained by a separate
department or staff within the child welfare agency.195 Once the
report is in the registry, the listed individual is at risk of being
flagged when an employer or other entity submits a clearance
request to the registry.196
The following section makes two key recommendations as
to how states can strengthen due process for parents at this
critical stage, prior to placing their names on the registry. First,
states should employ a higher burden of proof in making the
substantiation determination. Second, states should not place a
parent’s name on a registry until after he or she has had an
opportunity to exhaust available appeal procedures.
a. Raise Burden of Proof for Initial Inclusion in Registry
In at least seventeen states, a caseworker is permitted to
place a person on the state registry with only some “credible
evidence” or “probable cause” of abuse or neglect.197 However, a
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

An abuse investigator who completes the investigation of a child
abuse report made pursuant to Code Section 19-7-5 or otherwise
and determinates that it is a substantiated case if the alleged child
abuser was at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the act shall notify the division within 30 days following such
determination.
195. See, e.g., Child Protective Services Information System (Child Abuse
Registry), GA. DIV. OF FAM. & CHILD. SERVS., https://perma.cc/PM3S-6LY4 (last
visited Jan. 8, 2020) (stating that Georgia’s Division of Family and Children
Services maintains the registry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
196. See Kohl et al., supra note 190, at 18 (“29 states and the District of
Columbia allow or require agencies providing care to children and youth to be
checked against state databases . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-8(a)(1) (2019) (stating that a report is
indicated “[w]hen credible evidence and professional judgment
substantiates . . . abuse or neglect”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(9) (2019)
(requiring “reasonable cause”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-804.01(D) (2019)
(using “probable cause”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101g (2019) (“[T]he
commissioner shall determine, based upon a standard of reasonable cause,
whether a child has been abused or neglected . . . .”); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.
r. 65C-30.001 (2019) (“‘Finding’ means the investigative determination that
there is credible evidence to support or refute the alleged child
maltreatment.”); HAW. CODE R. § 17-1610-2 (2019) (using “reasonable cause”);
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2019) (requiring “credible evidence” for a report to be
indicated); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 7 (1981), 1981 WL 37084 (interpreting
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clear majority—over twenty-nine states—require a higher
burden of proof, such as “substantial evidence” or a
“preponderance of the evidence.”198 State legislatures in states
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Iowa statute on child abuse report standard to mean “some credible evidence”
(citing IOWA CODE § 232.71D (2020))); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 615 (2019)
(requiring only that “there is evidence of child abuse or neglect”); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701 (West 2020) (stating that an indicated report is a
“finding that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily
refuted”); 110 MASS. CODE REGS. § 4.32 (2019) (requiring a standard of
“reasonable cause to believe”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 432B.170 (2019) (requiring
“credible evidence”); N.M. CODE R. § 8.10.3.17 (West 2019) (requiring “credible
evidence”); N.Y. SOC. SERVS. L. § 412 (McKinney 2019) (stating that a report is
“indicated” if an investigator determines that “some credible evidence” exists);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A § 1-2-106 (West 2019) (requiring “probable cause”);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101 (West 2019) (requiring a “reasonable basis”);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912 (West 2019) (stating that a substantiated “report
is based upon accurate and reliable information that would lead a reasonable
person to believe” that abuse or neglect occurred).
198. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-702 (West 2019) (requiring a
“preponderance of the evidence”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12 (West 2019)
(defining a “substantiated report” as a report that “is based upon evidence that
makes it more likely than not that child abuse or neglect . . . occurred”); 12
COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-2:7.111(B) (2020) (stating that a basis for appeal is
that a founded report is not supported by a “preponderance of credible
evidence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 902 (2019) (stating that substantiation
requires a “finding by a preponderance of the evidence”); D.C. CODE
§ 4-1301.02 (2020) (“Substantiated report means a report . . . which is
supported by credible evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence.”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-180 (West 2019) (stating that a substantiated case is
based on a preponderance of the evidence); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.06.01.560
(2019) (using the standard of “more likely than not”); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-9-2-123 (West 2020) (defining a substantiated report as one based upon
the “preponderance of evidence”); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-46-10 (2019) (using
“preponderance of evidence”); 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:330 (2019) (requiring a
“preponderance of evidence”); ME. OFFICE OF CHILD & FAM. SERVS., CHILD AND
FAMILY SERVICES POLICY § IV.D-1 (using a standard of “preponderance of facts
and evidence”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.628d (2019) (requiring a finding of
evidence of abuse or neglect before listing on central registry); MINN. R.
§ 9560.0220 (2019) (requiring “a preponderance of the evidence”); 18-102 MISS.
CODE R. § E (LexisNexis 2019) (using a standard of “substantial and material
evidence”); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152 (2019) (requiring preponderance of the
evidence after 2004); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.47.614 (2019) (explaining that only
substantiated reports, which are based on a preponderance of evidence, may
be disclosed through the registry); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-720 (2019) (defining
an “agency substantiated” report as based on a preponderance of the evidence);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3, -C:35 (2019) (stating that “‘[f]ounded report’
means a report made pursuant to this chapter for which the department finds
by a preponderance of the evidence” and only founded reports are put on the
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such as New York have recently reviewed this issue and voted
to raise the burden of proof to comport with the best practices of
the majority of states across the country.199
Low “credible evidence” or “probable cause” standards
present high risks of erroneous deprivation.200 “Some credible
evidence” has been interpreted to mean merely any “evidence
worthy of being believed.”201 Courts and scholars have described
this standard as requiring nothing more than rumor.202 If a
caseworker believes that there is any support for the allegation,
she can mark the allegation as substantiated, even if she
believes the allegation may not actually be true.203 This low
standard not only does not require the caseworker to seek out
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

registry); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:10-7.3 (2019) (stating that “substantiated
report” is based on preponderance of the evidence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-320
(2019) (using “substantial evidence”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303 (2019) (stating
that the basis for an indicated report is a finding of “substantial evidence”);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-930 (2019) (stating that indicated findings must be
based upon on a preponderance of evidence); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:14:39:04 (2020)
(defining a substantiated report as one based upon a “preponderance of the
evidence”); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 0250-07-09-.06 (2018) (stating that
substantiation requires a “preponderance of the evidence”); 40 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 700.511 (2019) (defining “reason-to-believe” as “based on a
preponderance of the evidence”); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-10 (2019)
(defining “founded” as based on “a preponderance of the evidence”); WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.44.020 (2020) (defining a “founded report” as a determination
that “it is more likely than not that child abuse or neglect did occur”); WISC.
STAT. § 48.981 (2020) (requiring “a preponderance of the evidence”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202 (West 2019) (using “a preponderance of the evidence”).
199. See S. 6427A, 2019 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (proposing legislation that
heightens the burden of proof for adding an individual to the state’s registry);
see also LAUREN SHAPIRO & SARA L. HILTZIK, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON
LEGISLATION BY THE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND THE CHILDREN AND THE LAW
COMMITTEE 3 (2019), https://perma.cc/4PSF-UYG9 (PDF) (explaining that the
proposed legislation would heighten New York’s standard to be more
consistent with the majority of other states).
200. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 335 (explaining the link between
the stringency of the standard and the associated risks).
201. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) (citing
state guidance on the meaning of “some credible evidence”).
202. See id. (“One commentator has observed that this standard
safeguards only against bad faith or entirely unfounded reports of child abuse:
it provides no assurance that reports sounding reasonable are, nevertheless,
erroneous because the same evidence motivating the report will provide the
basis for confirming it.” (citation omitted)).
203. See id. (stating that the standard “allows a report to be indicated if
only one out of several believable items of evidence supports it”).
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evidence favorable to the parent, but also does not require her
to weigh the available evidence.204 The lack of requirement for
weighing evidence and justifying decisions encourages
caseworkers to base their decisions on intuition.205 These
determinations thus become entry points for bias.206
Caseworkers make the same errors inherent in all human
decision-making: when they form a quick intuitive assessment,
they are “skeptical about information when it conflict[s] with
their view of [a] family but . . . [are] uncritical when the new
evidence support[s] their view.”207 They often face institutional
pressure to be risk averse and substantiate cases even if they
doubt that neglect or abuse occurred because the agency may
face negative media attention if they fail to monitor a family.208
Studies have documented that, in the wake of high-profile child
fatalities, child protection workers react by going into “panic”
mode,209 substantiating drastically more cases against parents,
without evidence that the actual incidence of abuse or neglect
has risen in the population.210 These “panics” ultimately make
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

204. See id. (“[The standard] imposes no duty on the fact finder to weigh
conflicting evidence, no matter how substantial . . . .”).
205. See id. (“Under the present standard a fact finder in such cases may
be tempted to rely on an intuitive determination, ignoring any contrary
evidence.”).
206. See Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. 2007)
(“As the probable cause standard does not require a balancing of available
evidence, it leaves the ultimate assessment ‘open to the subjective values’ of
the fact finder, thereby magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding.” (citation
omitted)).
207. See Eileen Munro, Common Errors of Reasoning in Child Protection
Work, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 745, 751 (1999) (explaining that child
protection professionals fail to maintain “a critical attitude to all evidence”).
208. See, e.g., Yoav Gonen, Child Abuse Reports Surge After High-Profile
Tragedies, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2018, 2:51 PM), https://perma.cc/Q56C-VPCC
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (describing the intense media pressure that New
York’s Administration of Children Services faced after the deaths of Zymere
Perkins and Jaden Jordan in late 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
209. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 322 (explaining that “foster care
panic” is “the tendency of child welfare systems to engage in a frenzied push
toward removal of children from their homes following the highly publicized
death of a child”).
210. See Katie Hanna, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, UNDER PRESSURE:
HOW THE CITY’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM RESPONDED TO RECENT HIGH-PROFILE
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children less safe by overburdening systems and resulting in
more children experiencing the traumas associated with
removal
and
state
intervention.211
Finally,
the
overrepresentation of people of color in the child welfare system
suggests that caseworker determinations may be influenced by
implicit and explicit racial bias.212 Studies suggest that black
and Native American children are twice as likely to have their
parents subjected to child welfare investigations, but also twice
as likely to have that investigation substantiated against their
parent.213 Under the low “credible evidence” standard, these
faulty decision-making processes are encouraged and no
safeguards exist to cut against the current.214 In fact, courts in
multiple states have acknowledged that this low standard is
largely responsible for a “disturbingly high number of false
positive findings of abuse.”215
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

TRAGEDIES 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/9W4A-CC55 (PDF) (determining that
“the number of reports of abuse that were substantiated rose by 20 percent in
fiscal year 2017” after two high-profile child fatalities occurred).
211. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 323–24 (summarizing the
detrimental effects of the child protection agency’s “panic”).
212. See ROBERT B. HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN
CHILD WELFARE, AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPROPORTIONALITY AND
DISPARITY AT THE NATIONAL, STATE, AND COUNTY LEVELS 1–2 (2007), https://
perma.cc/652W-BGB4 (PDF) (explaining that overrepresentation of minorities
in the child welfare system occurs at each phase of decision-making in the
process). While scholars debate what accounts for the racial disproportionality
in the child welfare system, there is evidence that racial disproportionality
worsens as families move through the child welfare system based on a variety
of determinations made by caseworkers. See id. (identifying three phases of
decision-making—investigation, substantiation, and placement into foster
care—and finding minority overrepresentation at each phase).
213. See id. at 10–11 (“[B]lacks and American Indians are about twice as
likely to be investigated or substantiated than whites . . . .”).
214. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996)
(summarizing the risks inherent to a low standard).
215. See id. at 1252 (citing evidence that seventy-five percent of challenged
reports were reversed after administrative hearings); see also Jamison v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Mo. 2007) (citing evidence that Missouri’s
Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board reverses the local agency’s “probable
cause determination[s] somewhere in the vicinity of 35–40% of the time”).
These courts reconciled the due process concerns by allowing the “some
credible evidence” standard at the initial stage and then requiring a higher
standard of proof at the administrative hearing before the report is released
to employers. Given that this Article argues for a broader appreciation of the

898

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 857 (2020)

For all these reasons, states should require a higher burden
of proof for placing an individual on the registry. A higher
standard, such as preponderance of the evidence, and
regulations requiring investigating caseworkers to gather
available evidence that does not just support the initial
assessment but also any evidence that may conflict with that
assessment, and then to weigh the conflicting evidence, would
greatly improve the accuracy of substantiation. A recent study
found that requiring a high standard of proof for substantiation
of child abuse and neglect does, in fact, influence the disposition
of reports.216 This study focused on five states: the District of
Columbia, California, Idaho, Missouri and Wyoming, examining
the effects after each of these states increased the burdens of
proof from credible evidence to a preponderance of the
evidence.217 In some states, the study found that the higher
standard reduced the likelihood of substantiation by five
percent.218 Across states that employ a variation of standards, a
heightened standard of proof is associated with a fourteen
percent decrease in the likelihood of substantiation.219 States
that raise their burden of proof can and have trained
investigators on how to thoroughly collect evidence, document
observations without using conclusory language, and balance
the weight of the evidence.220
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, the high risk of erroneous
deprivation presented by the low “some credible evidence”
standard must be weighed against the state’s interest in
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

private interest beyond employment interests, we argue that a higher burden
of proof should be established at the initial stage as well.
216. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 333 (“[A] high standard is
associated with lower rates of substantiation.”).
217. See id. at 346–50 (summarizing each state’s policy change and the
effect of that change).
218. See id. at 334 (“[A]n increase in the standard of proof decreases the
odds of substantiation by 1–5%.”).
219. See id. at 343 (“[A]n increase in the standard of proof is associated
with a decrease in the odds of substantiation of 14%.” (citation omitted)).
220. See Joan Owhe, Note, Indicated Reports of Child Abuse or
Maltreatment: When Suspects Become Victims, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 323
(2013) (explaining the techniques that investigators would need to employ to
meet a heightened standard); see also Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 350
(noting that the Missouri Department of Social Services held a mandatory
training on how to carefully employ the standard of proof after the legislative
reform).
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maintaining such a low threshold.221 When assessed in light of
the many states that employ a higher standard—with no
concomitant reduction in their ability to ensure children’s
safety—the state’s interest is revealed to be less weighty than
traditionally thought.222 There are currently no studies that
suggest that states with a higher burden of proof face increased
rates of child abuse and neglect nor any increase in child
fatalities due to an agency’s failure to substantiate a case
against a parent.223 According to the recent study discussed
above, an increase in the standard of proof is not associated with
an increase in child fatalities in the state.224
b. Do Not Place Name in Registry Until Right to a Hearing Has
Been Exercised and Exhausted
Most states place a person’s name on their registry
immediately after the report is substantiated by a brief agency
investigation.225 Under this system, the onus is then on the
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

221. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) (explaining
that the state’s interest in keeping a low standard is to retain its ability to
“respond quickly to isolate children from potentially dangerous contact with
adults on the first indication of possible maltreatment and forewarn providers
and licensing agencies of possible future harm”). In this case, the court
brushed by the analysis by simply referring to the state’s parens patriae
interest generally, with no further explanation. See id. (“[T]he State has a
strong interest in preserving and promoting [children’s] health and welfare
and protecting them from abuse.” (citation omitted)).
222. See, e.g., Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Mo.
2007) (explaining that while protecting children from abuse and neglect is a
significant interest, inclusion in the registry is a “complement to the additional
and more immediate protective measures” already permitted by state law).
223. See Kohl et al., supra note 190, at 19 (“To our knowledge, there is no
existing evidence that substantiation is a general and powerful predictor or
rereport or recidivism or any other meaningful subsequent events.”).
224. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 358 (“[A]n increase in the standard
of proof is not associated with an increase in fatalities in total.”).
225. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019)
Each child protective service shall . . . upon the receipt of each
written report . . . transmit, forthwith, a copy thereof to the state
central register of child abuse and maltreatment. In addition, not
later than seven days after receipt of the initial report, the child
protective service shall send a preliminary written report of the
initial investigation, including evaluation and actions taken or
contemplated, to the state central register.
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individual to challenge their registry status, even as the report
remains on file and the consequences are ever-present.226 Even
when an individual immediately files a request for a hearing,
the administrative appeal process can take months or over a
year.227 By the time the individual reaches their administrative
hearing, they may have already experienced substantial
deprivations: they may have lost their employment, had a
finding entered against them in a custody case, or been
prevented from volunteering at their child’s school.
Some state courts have found that placing an individual on
the registry prior to a hearing violates due process under their
state constitutions.228 Those courts observed that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was high because parents are not always
afforded an opportunity to respond to allegations during the
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-182 (West 2019)
An abuse investigator who completes the investigation of a child
abuse report made pursuant to Code Section 19-7-5 or otherwise
and determinates that it is a substantiated case if the alleged child
abuser was at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the act shall notify the division within 30 days following such
determination.
226. See Stewart, supra note 157 (“[I]n New York, it is especially easy to
get on the database and arduous to be removed, amounting to a blacklist for
many jobs . . . .”).
227. When a parent challenges their status on the registry, the agencies
first do an administrative review before proceeding to a hearing. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-811(E) (2019) (“If a request for a hearing is made . . . the
department shall conduct a review before the hearing.”). The case is then often
set for a pre-trial conference and awaits a hearing date. See, e.g., id.
(explaining that if the agency “does not amend the information or finding in
the report . . . within sixty days after it receives [a] request for a hearing,” the
individual has a right to a hearing). Many states require administrative
hearings to be stayed until related family court cases are concluded, thereby
extending the time that the person is on the registry even further. See, e.g., id.
§ 8-811(F)(1) (providing that an individual does not have a right to a hearing
if that individual is a party in a pending proceeding “in which the allegations
of abuse or neglect are at issue”). For parents who have pending cases in family
court, they are incentivized to speed up their cases by accepting settlements
so they can challenge their registry status immediately. See, e.g., id. (stating
that a pending proceeding related to the matter prevents an individual from
seeking a hearing).
228. See In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d 41, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that
North Carolina’s registry procedures “violate[d] an individual’s due process
rights by listing the individual on the [registry] prior to a hearing”); Jamison,
218 S.W.3d at 417 (concluding that the inclusion of individuals on the registry
prior to a hearing violates the due process rights of those individuals).
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brief agency investigation, and “[n]o matter how elaborate, an
investigation does not replace a hearing.”229 The courts further
found that the state’s interest in immediately placing an
individual on the registry does not outweigh the private interest
because the registry is a “complement to the additional and
more immediate protective measures” permitted by law, such as
removing children from dangerous environments or pursuing
criminal charges against an alleged perpetrator.230
States should not place a person’s name on the registry
until an individual has an opportunity to exhaust his or her
right to a hearing and appeal. Some states have attempted to
resolve this “justice delayed is justice denied” problem, with
varying success. Some simply provide expedited hearings when
a person is facing “imminent collateral consequences.”231 But
some, such as Louisiana and Maryland, do not place a person’s
name on the registry until the deadline to appeal expires or the
individual loses their administrative hearing.232 Some states
have taken even more protective measures, such as South
Carolina and Mississippi, which do not place anyone on the
registry unless and until the child protective agency petitions
family court and the family court orders the placement of a

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

229. See In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d at 50 (“Although the accused individual
may have the opportunity to respond to the investigator’s inquiries, this
opportunity is not guaranteed and there is no requirement that, at the time of
the interview, the individual be apprised of the allegations against him.”);
Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at 408–09 (stating the investigative process does “not
constitute an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time or in a ‘meaningful
manner’” (citations omitted)).
230. Id. at 51.
231. See, e.g., 10-148-201 ME. CODE R. § XI (LexisNexis 2019) (“[T]he Chief
Administrative Hearing Officer shall give priority to any case in which the
record . . . shows that the appellant has or is likely to suffer imminent
collateral consequences as a result of the substantiation decision.”); GA. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-183(d) (West 2019) (“A motion for an expedited hearing may be
filed in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Office of
State Administrative Hearings.”).
232. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-706.1 (West 2020) (noting that the
individual’s name will not be placed on the registry unless “the individual has
been found responsible for indicated abuse or neglect”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN.
art. 616 (2019) (noting that the individual’s name is not placed on the registry
until the “individual’s administrative appeals are exhausted”).
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person on the registry.233 Finally, some states such as North
Carolina have created two separate registries, the “Central
Registry” and the Responsible Individuals List (RIL).234 A
substantiated finding can be immediately placed on the
“Central Registry,” an internal database that is only accessed
by child protection workers for the purposes of tracking
complaints against a family.235 Only the RIL is accessible by
employers and courts in custody matters.236 Names are not
placed on the RIL until a person fails to file an appeal in a timely
manner or loses their appeal.237
The value of a pre-deprivation hearing is high because it
allows a hearing to be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented.238 However, the value of requiring a
pre-deprivation hearing depends on whether the state
effectively requires actual notice and has reasonable deadline
provisions. For example, if the state has an unusually short
deadline for requesting a hearing, such as ten days, and allows
a finding to be entered absent a request for a hearing, allowing
a pre-deprivation hearing will not provide a meaningful
protection for parents.239 As discussed below, this Article

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257
(2019). For example, in South Carolina, the Department must petition Family
Court with a written case summary and argue to the court that 1) abuse and
neglect is established by a preponderance of evidence and 2) the nature and
circumstances of the act indicate the person would present a “significant risk
of committing physical or sexual abuse or willful or reckless neglect if placed
in position or setting outside of the person’s home that involves the care of or
substantial contact with children.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930. The
Department has discretion to decide which cases it chooses to petition for
placement on the registry and is only required to file a petition for cases of
sexual abuse. Id.
234. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-311(b) (2019).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (noting
that pre-deprivation hearings reduce procedural unfairness in this context
because “[t]he damage to the subject following publication of an
unsubstantiated report of child abuse may be irreversible”).
239. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(c) (West 2019) (allowing an
individual ten days to request a hearing); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(5p) (West
2019) (same).
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recommends that states adopt a longer time frame to allow
people to request hearings, such as 180 days.240
2. Notice
Notice, the legal warning that is delivered to a party whose
rights are affected by a private or state action, is an essential
element of due process because the right to be heard has “little
reality or worth unless one is informed that a matter is pending
and can choose for himself or herself whether to appear or
default, acquiesce, or contest.”241 The Due Process Clause does
not prescribe the particular form or contents of notice.242
However, at a minimum, the notice must provide individuals a
reasonable time to respond.243 The contents of notice must fairly
describe how the party can effectuate their rights and the
consequences of his or her failure to act.244
Currently, all states have some procedure to notify
individuals when they are placed on the child abuse and neglect
registry.245 Current practice does not, however, adequately
protect individuals’ rights. First, current practice does not take
into account that the vast majority of individuals facing child
welfare investigations are living in poverty.246 Scholars have
argued that in similar administrative hearings, such as
hearings to terminate public assistance, the daily challenges of

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

240. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.627 (West 2019) (allowing 180
days from the date of service of notice to request a hearing).
241. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 983 (2020).
242. Id. § 983.
243. Id. § 986.
244. Id. § 987.
245. See Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Interim
Report to the Congress on the Feasibility of a National Child Abuse Registry,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 15, 2009), https://perma.cc
/8G8J-ZNED (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (detailing the due process and
notification characteristics of state central child abuse registries) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 171, 174 (2003) (“Poverty is key to explaining why almost any child
gets in the system.”).
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poverty prevent self-represented litigants from pursuing
meritorious claims.247
Second, despite the critical role of notice in due process,
most states have not created clear statutory rules for notifying
individuals of their placement on the child abuse and neglect
registry.248 Without clear rules in the statute, these states leave
the form and contents of the notice to the agency’s discretion.
Following the best practices of their peers, states can adopt a
number of small, practical innovations that ensure individuals
receive, understand, and have the opportunity to respond to
these notices.
a. Send Notice via Certified Mail
Currently, there is no uniformity among states in how they
effectuate notice.249 At least four states, including Georgia and
North Carolina, require the agency to send notice letters by
certified mail.250 Most states simply require the agency to send
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

247. See Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public
Assistance Administrative Hearings, 23 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 134
(2007) (proposing that “the public benefits hearing process is in fact
fundamentally unfair to low-income appellants and that these appellants are
almost always at a significant disadvantage in the hearing process”); see also
Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 273, 278
(2009) (addressing “whether unrepresented welfare claimants actually receive
the ‘due process of law’ promised by Goldberg, or whether the absence of
counsel . . . denies vulnerable families any meaningful opportunity to be
heard”).
248. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.19 (West 2020) (“[T]he department
shall provide notice to a person named in the report as having abused a child
of the right to a contested case hearing . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916
(West 2019) (“[A] person alleged to have abused or neglected a child and whose
name has been placed on the Registry . . . shall be notified of the Registry
entry, provided with the Commissioner’s findings, and advised of the right to
seek an administrative review . . . .”).
249. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.100(3) (2020) (requiring
notification by certified mail, and if returned, notification attempted through
personal service), with 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.12 (West 2019) (requiring
written notification to be sent to the alleged perpetrator by both regular and
certified mail).
250. See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(a)(2) (West 2019) (requiring notice to
be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 7B-320 (2019) (“[T]he director shall send the notice to the individual by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to the
individual at the individual’s last known address.”).
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notice letters by regular mail to the person’s last known
address.251 Under the current form of notice in most states, the
risk of erroneous deprivation is high.
Careful attention to the methods for effectuating notice is
vital, because families who are subject to substantiation are
disproportionately poor and homeless, meaning that they are
less likely to receive mail. Homeless families are more likely
than low-income families who are housed to be the focus of a
child protective services investigation.252 In fact, many parents
may be placed on the registry precisely because they are
struggling to provide stable shelter for their children.253 Even if
parents on the registry are not homeless, families living in
poverty often lack access to stable housing and move
frequently.254
States should require notice to be sent by certified mail.
Certified mail “provides the sender with a mailing receipt and
electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a
delivery attempt was made.”255 Without the use of certified mail,
the notice letter may be sent to an outdated mailing address and
the agency has no indication that delivery was unsuccessful and
no reason to attempt more rigorous methods of providing
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

251. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.5 (2019) (“All
hearings held pursuant to this Part will be scheduled by means of a written
notice issued to the appellant and his or her representative, if known, by the
department.”).
252. See AMY DWORSKY, FAMILIES AT THE NEXUS OF HOUSING AND CHILD
WELFARE 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q72U-NY4F (PDF) (“[H]omeless families
are more likely than their non-homeless counterparts to be the focus of a child
protective services (CPS) investigation . . . .”).
253. Many parents are investigated for child neglect if they are homeless
and struggling to supply their children with adequate shelter. For example,
one case study found that the shelter intake centers in Washington D.C. often
call the CPS Hotline after parents submit applications. Marta
Beresin, Reporting Homeless Parents for Child Neglect: A Case Study from Our
Nation’s Capital, 18 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 14, 26 (2015).
254. In one study of families living below the poverty line, the longest
residence for twenty-eight percent of families ranged from one to three years
and forty-two percent for five or more years. Cathryne L. Schmitz et al.,
Homelessness as One Component of Housing Instability and Its Impact on the
Development of Children in Poverty, 4 J. OF SOC. DISTRESS & THE HOMELESS
301, 309 (1995).
255. USPS, What is Certified Mail?, USPS.COM (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://perma.cc/35VB-UHX8 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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notice.256 The probable value of using certified mail is high
because it alerts agencies to the fact that notice was not
accomplished and provides an opportunity to attempt a different
address.257 Using certified mail presents a minimal expense to
the agency or state, and the burden of that expense is far
outweighed by the value of more effectively effectuating actual
notice to parents.258
b. Include Registry Consequences in Notice
States provide varying types and levels of information to
individuals in their notices. Most state statutes do not require
the agencies to provide any specific information about the
consequences of having their name listed in the state’s
registry.259 But at least one state—Washington—explicitly
requires by statute that a list of consequences of inclusion be
provided in the notice letter.260 As a result, the notice letters
sent in Washington inform parents that their registry status
may affect their employment and may be considered in a later
investigation of child abuse or neglect.261 Washington’s scheme
is a start, but it does not fully protect individuals’ rights. As
discussed in this Article, a number of important consequences
may flow from registry inclusion, including effects on parents’
custody and visitation rights and their ability to perform the
daily tasks of parenting, such as volunteering at their children’s
schools.262

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Certified Mail Labels, New USPS Certified Mail Costs,
CERTFIEDMAILLABELS.COM, https://perma.cc/FYH6-HL7J (last visited Jan. 8,
2020) (detailing the updated 2020 USPS certified mail service cost) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
259. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2019) (showing that
New York does not require state agencies to inform individuals of the potential
consequences of having their name on the registry).
260. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.125 (2020) (providing that the notice
letter must explain, among other things, that the department may use the
founded report in determining if the individual is qualified to be employed in
a position having unsupervised access to children or vulnerable adults).
261. Id.
262. See supra Part II.A.
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Providing notice of the actual consequences of inclusion in
a child abuse and neglect registry is vital to ensuring due
process. Without listing these consequences on notice letters,
most states place individuals at a high risk of erroneous
deprivation.263 If individuals do not understand the extent of the
consequences of being on the registry, they may not understand
the value of contesting their status relative to the time and
burden of pursuing an administrative appeal.264 Individuals
often have a short time frame in which to make this cost-benefit
analysis.265 The probable value of a clear explanation is high
because it ensures that individuals fully comprehend the
potential consequences to their employment and their parental
autonomy. The state’s interest does not outweigh the private
interest because there is no cost to adding additional
information to notice letters.
To provide adequate notice, due process requires that notice
letters inform parents of these consequences. In terms of
employment, the notice letter should provide more specific
information about the wide range of employers that have access
to the registry. In terms of parental autonomy, the notice letter
should, at a minimum, include the following consequences: a
report on the registry may be considered (1) in a later
investigation or family court proceeding related to a different
allegation of child abuse or neglect; (2) in a future custody
proceeding; (3) if a person wishes to adopt or serve as a kinship
foster home for relatives; and (4) by schools and youth
organizations, impeding volunteering in children’s activities.
c. Include Notice of Available Legal Services Providers
Generally, individuals contesting their inclusion in a
registry have the right to have an attorney present but do not
have the right to free legal representation at cost to the state.266
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. As described further below, most states have a short deadline for
filing a request to challenge a registry report, sometimes as short as ten days.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1 (2019) (ten days); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183
(West 2019) (ten days).
266.
CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS., REVIEW AND EXPUNCTION OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES AND REPORTING
RECORDS (2018), https://perma.cc/34DR-2N4M (PDF).
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Most states simply require that their notice letters inform the
individual that they have the right to an attorney, if the statute
speaks to this at all.267 At least one state—Arkansas—goes
further, requiring its notice letter to provide the name of a free
local legal services organization, the Center for Arkansas Legal
Services.268
According to practitioners across the country, the vast
majority of petitioners challenging registry inclusion are
currently representing themselves (pro se) in their hearings.269
In contrast, the child protective agencies are always represented
by counsel.270 Agency counsel have clear advantages over pro se
litigants, including familiarity with agency records, which can
include acronyms and jargon, and knowledge of how to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses.271 Studies suggest that
pro se litigants across a range of administrative hearings have
far less favorable outcomes than represented parties.272 Pro se
litigants in child abuse and registry hearings face an even
greater uphill battle. First, the registry hearings do not only
involve factual allegations, but also include interpreting the
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

267. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-706 (West 2019) (“Notification to an
alleged offender . . . shall include . . . [a] statement that the person has a right
to have an attorney . . . .”).
268. Id. § 12-18-706. An appellate court in New Jersey recently went much
further, holding that “indigent litigants are entitled to the appointment of
counsel when faced with a Division declaration that its investigation has
substantiated that litigant for child abuse or neglect.” N.J. Dep’t of Children
& Families v. L.O., 213 A.3d 187, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019).
269. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael
Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21 PM EST) (on file with author); E-mail from
Diana Rugh Johnson, Law Office of Diana Rugh Johnson, PC, (Mar. 13, 2019,
11:54 AM EST) (on file with author); see also Kramer, supra note 155, at 3.
270. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael
Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21 PM EST) (on file with author).
271. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 247, at 318 (“The playing field
in pro se hearings slants far from level because the local agency is represented
by trained advocates who have enormous tactical advantages over the
claimant . . . .”).
272. See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and
the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
453, 460 (2011) (“[R]epresented litigants are anywhere from two to ten times
more likely to procure the relief they seek when they enjoy the benefit of full
representation by counsel.”).
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legal definitions of “abuse” and “neglect.”273 These statutory
definitions are often vague and the subject of extensive
decisional interpretation.274 Crafting well-supported arguments
therefore may require legal research tools that are not
accessible to pro se litigants.
Being represented by an attorney is also important because
preparing a parent to testify may be the most consequential act
of the hearing process. According to practitioners, the parent is
expected to testify in the hearing on their own behalf and will
be subject to cross-examination by agency counsel.275 A trained
advocate can help a parent to clearly and faithfully present his
or her story in a way that an individual acting alone may not be
able to do.276 The hearing officer’s determination often turns
heavily, if not fully, on the parent’s testimony. The parent may
be required to testify about deeply intimate or sensitive topics,
such as their struggle with an addiction or mental illness.277
Many parents may be living in poverty, lack formal education,
and/or come from marginalized communities or groups.278 Once
they have put forward their testimony, they will be subject to
cross-examination by the agency’s counsel. The administrative
law judge (ALJ)’s assessment of the parent’s testimony, the
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

273. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2019).
274. For example, the term “neglected child” in New York is vaguely
defined as a child “whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the
failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise
a minimum degree of care . . . .” Id.
275. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie
E. Saltzman, LLC, (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (on file with author); E-mail
from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21
PM EST) (on file with author).
276. See ANTONIO ROBISON ET AL., WITNESS PREPARATION—ETHICAL,
PRACTICAL,
AND
COMMON
SENSE
CONSIDERATIONS
1–5
(2017),
https://perma.cc/WUQ7-5M2M (PDF) (highlighting the importance of witness
preparation in the context of depositions, hearings, and arbitrations).
277. See, e.g., Jake Gilbreath, Health Records in Child Custody Cases, THE
WALTERS GILBREATH, PLLC BLOG (July 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/G66D-TDQK
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (noting that physical and mental health records are
not necessarily protected by HIPAA and state rules of evidence) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. See Herma Hill Kay & Irving Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child
Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 726–39 (1966) (discussing how poverty
influences child custody decisions).
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all-important credibility determination, is vulnerable to the
effects of bias.279
Failing to provide a list of free legal service providers in
notice letters places individuals at a high risk of erroneous
deprivation. As discussed above, since the vast majority of
individuals on the registry cannot afford an attorney, simply
informing individuals that they have a right to counsel is not
meaningful. Studies suggest that many low-income Americans
do not seek out legal assistance for their civil legal needs
because they do not know where to look or they do not believe
that free legal help exists.280 The probable value of providing a
list of free legal service providers is high. While civil legal
organizations may not be able to provide representation at every
hearing, these organizations can provide basic advice about the
notice letter and explain the value of an administrative
hearing.281
Notice letters should clearly state that a person has a right
to consult and be represented by an attorney in an
administrative hearing and provide a list of free legal service
providers who may be available to assist those who cannot
afford an attorney. In certain states, civil legal service
organizations may be able to answer questions about the
administrative appeal process.282 The State’s interest does not
outweigh the private interest because there is no cost to adding
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

279. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (noting that, in the
context of termination of parental rights proceedings, parents facing child
abuse investigations are vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class
bias because they are often poor, uneducated, and members of minority
groups).
280. According to a recent report on civil legal needs, low-income
Americans do not seek legal help for eighty percent of their civil legal
problems. Those who do not seek help report concerns about the cost of such
help, not being sure if their issues are legal in nature, and not knowing where
to look for help. LEGAL SERV. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP REPORT: MEASURING THE
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 29–33 (2017),
https://perma.cc/32WK-TZAP (PDF).
281. Civil legal service offices provide free counsel regarding a wide range
of administrative hearings, such as termination of unemployment insurance
and social security benefits. There are an estimated 900 civil legal aid
programs across the country and 900 pro bono programs through the
American Bar Association. Id. at 79.
282. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.301–24.306 (West 2019)
(detailing Michigan’s judicial review process as defined by the Administrative
Procedures Act of 1969).
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additional information to notice letters. Furthermore, states
provide this information in notice letters for other
administrative hearings that frequently involve indigent
litigants.283
3. Abolish or Extend Statutes of Limitation for Challenging
Inclusion on Registry
Most states currently require individuals to respond to the
notice letter and file a request for a hearing within a very short
time frame. At least six states require action within a mere ten
to fifteen days after notice is received.284 Most states require
individuals to file a request within one to three months of
receiving notice.285 There are states, however, that diverge:
Nebraska does not set a time frame to request a hearing but
instead allows an appeal to be taken “[a]t any time subsequent
to completion of the investigation . . . .”286 A number of states
allow hearings to be granted for requests made after the
deadline if good cause is shown.287
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

283. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(12)(d) (McKinney 2019) (requiring
the state to inform appellants of the availability of community legal services
in hearings regarding the termination of public assistance).
284. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1 (2019) (giving an individual ten days to
request a hearing); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183 (West 2019) (same); MINN. STAT.
§ 626.556(10i) (2019) (fifteen days); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 432B.170 (2019)
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916a (West 2019) (fourteen days); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 48.981 (West 2019) (ten days).
285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-908 (West 2019) (giving an
individual thirty days to request a hearing); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.16
(West 2019) (sixty days); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-89(c) (West 2020) (thirty
days); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.152 (West 2018) (sixty days); MONT. ADMIN. R.
37.47.602 (2019) (thirty days); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:5-2.5 (2019) (twenty
days); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-8(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (ninety days); 23 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6341(a)(2) (2019) (ninety days); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-4a-1009 (West 2019) (thirty days); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1515 (2019)
(thirty days).
286. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-723 (2019).
287. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.627(6) (West 2019) (hearing
may be granted for “good cause shown” if within sixty days after 180 day notice
period expires); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-1009(3)(e) (West 2019) (request
may be granted after thirty days if person requesting can show good cause and
show why response was “unreasonably burdensome” during that time); COLO.
CODE REGS. § 2509-2:7.111(E) (2019) (hearing may be granted outside ninety
days if “good cause” shown). These grace periods do require additional
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When these current short deadlines are enforced, the risk
of erroneous deprivation is high. In Nebraska, where
individuals are permitted to appeal “at any time,” they often do
so several years after first receiving notice of their inclusion in
the registry—and win.288 For example, in 2015, the Nebraska
Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS) received
approximately eighty percent of its total requests for hearings
more than one year after notice was effectuated.289 In fact, the
majority of hearing requests were filed more than five years
after the parents on the registry received notice.290 Nebraska
has a remarkably high reversal rate: hearings were resolved in
favor of the petitioner registrant in thirty out of thirty-nine
administrative hearings held in 2016.291 The data from
Nebraska suggests that many individuals who cannot appeal
their inclusion in state registries because they failed to do so
within the brief and arbitrary period set by their state’s scheme
may, in fact, have valid claims for expungement.292
The reasons that individuals may not effectuate their rights
if limited to only brief periods within which to act are myriad.
Practical obstacles may deter parents with valid claims from
filing a request. In states that only allow requests within five or
fifteen days, a busy parent may fail to even read the letter before
the deadline expires. Short statutes of limitations pose a major
hurdle for parents who often do not understand the notice letter
and need time to contact a lawyer who can explain the
process.293 Even if parents fully understand the letter and
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

administrative resources to determine whether an exemption should be
granted.
288. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COPY OF CENT. REGISTRY
2015–2016 DATA (2018) (on file with author).
289. According to public records data received from NDHHS, the agency
received a total of 682 expungement requests in 2015. NDHHS only received
135 requests within a year of notice. NDHHS received ninety-one within one
to two years, sixty within two to three years, forty-five within three to four
years, thirty-four within four to five years, and 317 requests after more than
five years. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 288.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See KRAMER, supra note 155. Other practitioners have shared stories
about clients who bring the notice letter to their office after thirty days and
must be told that it is too late to appeal their registry status.
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process, they still may forfeit valid claims simply because they
do not understand the value of appealing their administrative
finding based on the information provided to them and their
current life circumstances. Circumstances change, however,
and parents may realize months or even years down the line
that their inclusion in the registry poses a barrier to their
long-term goals, such as public employment or higher education.
The fact that an overwhelming majority of Nebraska parents
appeal their registry status after five years suggests that this is
so. Additionally, parents who also have court petitions filed
against them often may be overwhelmed by fighting their case
in court and may fail to respond to the notice letter because their
attention is focused on the immediate crisis in their family.
States should abolish, or at the very least drastically
extend, the time period during which a parent or listed
individual may request an administrative hearing seeking to
have their name removed from the registry. States can adopt
similar language to Nebraska’s statute, which allows
expungement requests to be filed “[a]t any time subsequent to
completion of the investigation . . . .”294 Any additional burden
this change would impose on the states in the form of more
frequent hearings may be outweighed by the state’s interest in
reducing the number of false positives included in its child abuse
and neglect registry.295 It is also important to understand the
relative scale of this administrative and fiscal burden: even if
each of the estimated 50,000 people added each year to the
registry in New York296 filed an appeal, the number of hearing
requests would pale in comparison to the more than 213,000

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

294. NEB. REV. ST. ANN. § 28-723 (2019).
295. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996)
(“Enhancing procedural protections to protect private interests . . . may serve
the State’s interest in other ways by reducing the number of false negative
findings.”); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 96 YALE L. J. 455,
476–78 (1986) (discussing the “accuracy value” of procedural due process as
well as the dignity value of participation). The state’s interest is also discussed
in Part III.A.2.c, supra.
296. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 2, 6 (describing the estimated 50,000
people added to the registry in 2017, despite the State receiving fewer than
9,300 requests for removal).
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requests filed for public assistance hearings each year.297 For
states that maintain smaller registries, such as Pennsylvania,
where fewer than 5,000 reports are added each year,298 this
fiscal burden is even lighter.299 To reduce costs, these requests
can be evaluated more closely at the administrative review
stage300 or settled prior to a hearing.301 Given the high cost to
parents of erroneous inclusion, states should not tolerate a short
deadline that cuts off recourse for people whose names do not
belong on the registry.302

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

297. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2018
ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2018), https://perma.cc/BBS8-JQ6J (PDF) (“The
office . . . performs administrative hearings on behalf of other agencies and
processed more than 213,000 requests for hearings last year.”).
298. From 2012–2017, Pennsylvania has routinely added fewer than 5,000
reports of child abuse and neglect per year to the state registry. PA. DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVS., 2017 ANNUAL CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES REPORT 4 (2017),
https://perma.cc/U5QU-N5ZF (PDF).
299. See id. at 29 (discussing Pennsylvania’s low levels of funding required
to investigate child abuse, relative to the total local, state, and federal funding
for child welfare services in the state).
300. Almost every state requires the agency to immediately conduct an
administrative review, which consists of a department official examining the
investigation record and determining internally if the report is unfounded.
See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8) (McKinney 2019) (establishing the
requirements at the administrative review stage for New York child abuse
investigations); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341 (2019) (describing the process for
expungement or amendment of records from the child abuse database in
Pennsylvania by the Secretary of Human Services). According to practitioners,
the administrative review stage is severely underutilized and rarely results in
an overturned finding. See KATHERYN D. KATZ, 4 CHILD CUSTODY AND
VISITATION § 31.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2019) (“Although there are
procedures for administrative review for individuals seeking to have the
record expunged, if there is some credible evidence and the allegations are
reasonably related to child care, the report will not be expunged.”).
301. See, e.g., Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898
(2001) (describing a settlement agreement between the state and the accused
that led to an expungement of a child abuse report).
302. See Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse
Registries at the Intersection of Child Protection, Due Process, and Equal
Protection, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 23 (2001) (“[M]ost courts agree that being
listed on an employer-accessible child abuse registry does implicate an
individual’s due process rights to both employment and reputation.”).
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4. Evidentiary Hearings
If a parent receives proper notice and files a timely appeal,
she is entitled to an opportunity to be heard to challenge her
inclusion in the registry.303 Almost every state requires the
agency first to conduct an administrative review, consisting of a
department official examining the investigation record and
determining internally if the initial determination is
well-founded.304 If the department official declines to remove the
report, the parent then may proceed to an administrative
hearing before a hearing officer or ALJ.305 The hearing officer
serves as an impartial arbiter.306 In the hearing, the parent and
the child protective agency each have an opportunity to present
witnesses and documentary evidence to support their case.307
The rules of evidence are relaxed and hearsay is often

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

303. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(i) (stipulating the right of
the accused to request the commissioner to amend the report, and
subsequently request a fair hearing to review the child abuse report); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6341 (“[I]f the secretary refuses a request . . . the
perpetrator . . . shall have the right to appeal and request a hearing before the
secretary to amend or expunge an indicated report on the grounds that it is
inaccurate . . . .”).
304. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(ii) (establishing the process
by which the Office of Children and Family Services will review the report by
the investigating agency); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(a)(2) (describing the right
of the accused to request an administrative review by the Secretary prior to
an administrative hearing).
305. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(b) (providing the accused with
an opportunity for a fair hearing with the burden of proof on the state); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6341(c) (listing the hearing process requirements before an ALJ
or hearing officer in the event of a refusal to amend or expunge by the
Secretary).
306. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.6 (2019) (“The
hearing must be conducted by an impartial hearing officer who is employed by
the department for that purpose and who has not been involved in any way
with the action in question.”); ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7) (2019) (“The alleged
perpetrator shall have . . . [t]he right to have a hearing officer appointed who
shall be disinterested, fair, and impartial.”).
307. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(d) (“Each party
is entitled . . . to have witnesses give testimony and to otherwise have relevant
and material evidence presented on his or her behalf . . . .”); ALA. CODE
§ 26-14-7.1(7) (2019) (“The alleged perpetrator shall have . . . [t]he right to
present written evidence, oral testimony, and witnesses.”).
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permitted.308 As discussed above, the petitioner is often expected
to testify on her own behalf. Almost every state provides a right
to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to a court of competent
jurisdiction.309
The number of registry hearings held each year varies by
state. In New York and Georgia, states with large populations,
two to three thousand hearings are currently held per year.310
Nebraska, a state with a population under two million,311 holds
fewer than fifty hearings per year.312 Even in the most populous
states, the number of registry hearings pales in comparison to
the number of hearings held relating to other administrative
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308. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(e) (“Technical
rules of evidence following in a court of law will not apply but evidence
introduced must be relevant and material.”).
309. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(f) (West 2019) (requiring appeals
be brought to the superior court of the county); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152.6
(2018) (permitting de novo judicial review in the county circuit court); N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 3A:5-2.8 (2019) (providing judicial review authority to the
Appellate Division of Superior Court); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341(g)
(requiring appeals be brought to the Commonwealth Court). While rarely
used, this right to appeal can provide parties with meaningful recourse. See
also, e.g., Letter from Judy D. Holdaway, Ga. Dep’t of Family & Children
Servs. Deputy Gen. Counsel 3 (Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author) (providing
information on the Georgia Child Protective Services Information System).
For example, in Georgia, of the twenty-one cases that were appealed to the
Superior Court in 2017, eleven were overturned on appeal. Id.
310. According to public records gathered from the New York Office of
Children and Family Services, 3,829 hearings were held in 2016. See Letter
from Craig Sunkes, New York Office of Children and Family Services Records
Access Officer 2 (June 8, 2018) (stating the number of fair hearings that
occurred in 2016 in New York State) (on file with author). According to public
records gathered from Georgia Department of Human Services, 2,698 hearings
were held in 2017. Holdaway, supra note 309, at 3.
311. In 2018, the estimated state population of Nebraska was
approximately two million. See Resident Population in Nebraska, FED. RES.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://perma.cc/P7SE-LMUE (last updated Feb. 15, 2019)
(last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (providing Nebraska population data) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
312. According to public records gathered from Nebraska Department of
Health and Human Services, only thirty-nine hearings were held in 2016. See
E-mail from Jaime L. Hegr, Neb. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Attorney
(July 13, 2018) (on file with author) (providing data regarding child abuse
registry hearings in Nebraska).
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determinations, such as hearings challenging public assistance
determinations.313
We recommend the following practical reforms to ensure
that hearings are conducted in a manner that comports with due
process, based on best practices seen in states around the
country.
a. Disclosure and Compulsion of Evidence
Currently, most states either do not discuss the individual’s
rights at the hearing in their statute314 or provide the agency
responsible for handling the hearings with discretion to decide
these critical rights.315 When states delegate this task to
agencies, states run the risk that agencies will only provide a
few basic rights, such as the right to present and cross-examine
witnesses.316
States should ensure that parents are afforded certain
minimum due process protections during their hearings. States
can follow the model of Pennsylvania and Alabama, which
provide certain key rights, such as the right to automatic and
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313. For example, in New York, 13,023 hearings were held for denial of
public assistance in 2016–2017. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND
DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2017 STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF NEW
YORK
STATE
PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
55
(2017),
https://perma.cc/VA2H-GJBW (PDF) (providing data on hearings for public
assistance for 2016–2017 in the New York state).
314. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8) (McKinney 2019) (providing
little stipulated protection of the accused’s rights at the hearing); GA. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-183(d) (West 2019) (same).
315. Mississippi’s statute provided this level of discretion prior to 2019.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257(3) (2003) (“The Department of Human
Services shall adopt such rules and administrative procedures, especially
those procedures to afford due process to individuals who have been named as
substantiated perpetrators before the release of their name from the central
registry, as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.”).
316. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(d) (2019)
Each party is entitled to be represented by an attorney or other
representative of his or her choice, to have witnesses give testimony
and to otherwise have relevant and material evidence presented on
his or her behalf, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, to offer
rebuttal evidence and to examine any document or item offered into
evidence.
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complete disclosure of evidence prior to the hearing317 and the
right for individuals to ask for subpoenas to compel witnesses to
attend the hearing.318
Without the right to automatic disclosure of evidence, the
risk of erroneous deprivation is high.319 Agency counsel has a
strategic advantage over petitioners in cross-examination
because they can review the full notes of the child protective
investigation, including harmful statements from out-of-court
witnesses, prior to the hearing.320 Since hearsay is generally
permitted, agency counsel can surprise parents on the stand
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

317. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c) (2019) (“The department or county
agency shall provide a person making an appeal with evidence gathered
during the child abuse investigation within its possession that is relevant to
the child abuse determination . . . .”); see also ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(f)
(2019)
The alleged perpetrator shall have . . . the right to inspect any
exculpatory evidence which may be in the possession of
departmental investigators, and the right to be informed of such
evidence if known by departmental investigators before the
hearing; provided, that a request for such evidence is made at least
five working days prior to the date set for the hearing.
While both Pennsylvania and Alabama recognize the need to provide
individuals with critical information about the child protective investigation
prior to the hearing, Pennsylvania’s statute provides a more straightforward
process for pro se litigants and agency counsel. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c);
ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(f). First, the statute mandates automatic disclosure.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c). This is preferable for pro se litigants who may
not be aware of the right to file a request for exculpatory evidence or may not
file it within the right time frame. Id. Second, the statute simply requires
agency counsel to send the entire packet of case records to the individual on
the registry. Id. This is a more efficient procedure for agency counsel because
it does not require them to make a determination of what qualifies as
“exculpatory” evidence for the purposes of the hearing. Id.
318. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(i) (“The alleged perpetrator shall
have . . . the right to request issuance of subpoenas to witnesses and compel
attendance. This request must be received no later than ten calendar days
prior to the hearing, unless a shorter time is agreed upon by the hearing
officer.”).
319. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
(1951) (“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination
of facts decisive of rights. . . .”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)
(“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation.”).
320. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8 (providing no
opportunity for petitioners to obtain the documents prior to entrance into
evidence at a hearing).
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with witness statements that the parent could not reasonably
have anticipated. A damaging cross-examination can lead a
hearing officer to make an erroneous determination about the
parent’s credibility. The probable value of full disclosure is high
because it allows the parent to adequately prepare direct
testimony to address the possible motives and bias of the
witness. Allowing individuals to have a fair opportunity to
address witness bias is particularly critical for child abuse and
neglect reports, which “often occur in a context with no
disinterested witnesses,”321 such as former partners and family
members.
Without the right to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to
attend hearings, the right of erroneous deprivation also is
high.322 While parents have a right to present witnesses to
support their case, parents face unique barriers to conducting
their own independent investigation because of the stigma
associated with being accused of abuse or neglect in the
community.323 Take the example of an allegation against a
parent of a child coming to school unclean.324 The key witness in
this case may be a teacher who observed the child and called in
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

321. Molly Greer, Note, Suggestions to Solve the Injustices of the New York
State Central Register for Abuse and Maltreatment, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 729, 764 (2011); see also Phillips, supra note 23, at 188–89 (“Providing
the accused an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the informant solves
the problem of bad faith or erroneous testimony most effectively.”).
322. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8 (providing no
subpoena authority to the accused). Cf. Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218
S.W.3d 399, 416–17 (Mo. 2007) (denying the state subpoena power to compel
abuse reporters or victims to testify, when the accused were statutorily denied
the same right, given the result would be an unfair trial and a failure to meet
the minimal standards of due process). But see supra note 318 and
accompanying text.
323. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994) (“There is no
dispute that [the accused]’s inclusion on the list potentially damages her
reputation by branding her as a child abuser, which certainly calls into
question her good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.” (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted)).
324. This is a common allegation of failure to provide adequate clothing
and hygiene charged under the broader category of “neglect.” See, e.g., N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (2019) (defining neglect broadly as a child “whose
physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other
person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care”).
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the report.325 Any parent would feel uncomfortable approaching
a school professional about a child protective investigation,
especially if they are still regularly involved in the daily lives of
their children. Professionals may consider the discussion
inappropriate and refuse to speak with the parent. The probable
value of the right to issue subpoenas is high because the
petitioner could compel this witness to the hearing instead of
persuading them to testify. If subpoenaed to testify, the parent
can ask specific questions about the child’s appearance and
establish that, despite the conclusory language used in the child
protective investigator’s records, the child was dirty because of
a fight at recess.
Both subpoenas and full disclosure of documents can be
handled at a pre-trial conference, which are already routinely
held in many jurisdictions to inform parents of their rights and
to encourage settlement between the two parties prior to the
hearing.326 States can pay the cost for the sheriff’s office to serve
the subpoena or ask parties to serve their own subpoenas
through a disinterested party.327 To accomplish full disclosure,
agency counsel is only required to copy a packet of records to

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

325. See, e.g., David II. v. Tracy II., 854 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008) (“[A]nother teacher observed that the child frequently arrived at school
in an unbathed, disheveled condition, wore unclean clothes and exhibited a
pervasive urine smell when he entered the classroom.”).
326. See E-mail from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie E.
Saltzman, LLC, to author (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (describing the
limitations for releasing administrative findings in Colorado) (on file with
author); Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019) (discussing the use of pre-trial conferences by the state
to settle cases in Montana).
327. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(8) (2019) (“The Department of Human
Resources or its investigative hearing officers shall have the power and
authority to issue subpoenas to compel attendance by and production of
documents from any witness. Subpoenas may be served in the same manner
as subpoenas issued out of any circuit court.”); ALA. R. CIV. P. 45(b)
A subpoena issued on behalf of any party may be served by the
sheriff, a deputy sheriff, or any other person who is not a party, who
is not related within the third degree by blood or marriage to the
party seeking service of process, and who is not less than 19 years
of age or by certified mail pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4.
(emphasis added).
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provide to the parent.328 There may be some burden to the state
in requiring state employees to testify pursuant to subpoenas,
but this is outweighed by the state’s interest in accurate
adjudication and the value of offering parents a fair opportunity
to prepare their case prior to the hearing.329
b. Raise Burden of Proof at Hearing to “Preponderance of the
Evidence”
A majority of states require the child protective agency to
prove that abuse or neglect occurred by a preponderance of the
evidence or substantial evidence.330 However, a few states still
only require the agency to prove their case by the same low
standard that was used in the caseworker’s initial
investigation.331
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

328. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 184 (“The administrative costs of
evidentiary disclosure are not significant because the state must only copy the
documents in its possession or otherwise permit access to its evidence.”).
329. See id. at 184–85 (weighing the benefits of witness protection against
the value of knowledge of the identities of the state’s witnesses to the accused).
330. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-813 (West 2019) (using a
preponderance of the evidence standard); COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-2 (2019)
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101k(d)(2) (2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 925A(a) (2019) (same); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 5909.7 (2019) (same);
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(d)(4) (West 2019) (same); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89,
§ 336.115(c)(2)(B) (West 2019) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-9(b) (West
2020) (same); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-46-10 (2019) (same); LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 67, § 1111(F)(5) (2019) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.627(7) (2019)
(same); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2019) (following standard of proof in all state
human services hearings, which is preponderance of the evidence under MINN.
STAT. §256.045(3b)(a) (2019)); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152(5) (2019) (employing
a preponderance of the evidence standard); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-723 (2019)
(“A juvenile court finding of child abuse or child neglect shall be presumptive
evidence that the report was not unfounded.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-720(1)(c)
(2019) (using a preponderance of the evidence standard); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 422(8)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2019) (same); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c.2)(5) (2019)
(using a substantial evidence standard); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019)
(establishing a preponderance of the evidence standard); S.D. ADMIN. R.
67:14:39:07 (2019) (same); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 351.503(e) (2019) (same);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-1009(5)(a) (West 2019) (same); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.2-1526(A) (2019) (same); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 110-30-0340 (2020)
(same); WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3m)(c)(2) (2019) (same).
331. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(11)(a) (referencing when a hearing
officer determines the allegations are “indicated,” or “[w]hen credible evidence
and professional judgment substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is
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States should require the child protective agency to prove
at the hearing that abuse or neglect occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence. Without the preponderance of
the evidence standard at the hearing, the risk of erroneous
deprivation is high. Several state supreme courts have ruled
that the preponderance of the evidence standard at the hearing
is necessary to guard against a high risk of erroneous
deprivation.332 In fact, most court cases challenging the
procedures for the child abuse and neglect registry have focused
on the burden of proof at the hearing as the most troubling
procedural deficiency. The probable value of using an elevated
preponderance standard is high because it allows the evidence
to be weighed carefully by the finder of fact. This is especially
important in an evidentiary hearing because the hearing officer
may need to compare and contrast different versions of the same

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

responsible for child abuse or neglect.” (ALA. CODE § 26-14-8 (2019))); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-811(K) (2019) (“On completion of the presentation of
evidence, the administrative law judge shall determine if probable cause exists
to sustain the department’s finding that the parent, guardian or custodian
abused or neglected the child.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916a(e) (West 2019)
(“The Department shall have the burden of proving that it has accurately and
reliably concluded that a reasonable person would believe that the child has
been abused or neglected by that person.”).
332. See, e.g., Cavarretta v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 660 N.E.2d
250, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[The Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS)] should at least be required to prove its case by a
preponderance of the evidence. This standard would allow DCFS and the
subject to share the risk of error, rather than have the accused bear the brunt
of the risk.”); Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Mo. 2007)
(“Due process requires a [Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board] to
substantiate a report of child abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the
evidence before an individual’s name can be included in and disseminated
from the registry.”); Benitez v. Rasmussen, 626 N.W.2d 209, 218 (Neb. 2001)
(analyzing a deprivation of liberty without due process in three parts under
the preponderance of the evidence standard: (1) what liberty interest is at
stake, (2) “what procedural safeguards are required,” (3) whether there was a
denial of the process due); In re Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590 (N.H. 1998)
(concluding that the liberty interest in a registry appeal demands the same
preponderance of the evidence standard required when protecting the liberty
interest in having a parent-child relationship, balanced against the state
interest in protecting the safety of children); Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d
1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (“We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution requires the Department to substantiate reports of child
abuse by a fair preponderance of the evidence . . . .”).

INADEQUATE PROTECTION

923

event.333 The state’s interest is low because there is little
expense associated with this ratcheting up of the burden of
proof.334 The fact that a clear majority of states employ
preponderance of the evidence suggests that the state’s interests
are not compromised by a higher burden of proof at the hearing
stage.
c. Automatically Expunge Reports When Court Dismisses
Petition
One important feature of child abuse and neglect registry
systems is that they do not operate in a vacuum. In all states,
related but separate court proceedings may be held for those
cases for which the agency determines court intervention is
needed.335 In these proceedings, the court is tasked with
determining not only whether abuse or neglect did, in fact,
occur, but also what should happen to ensure that the child
remains safe and the family is able to reunify, if at all
possible.336 An integral feature of these court proceedings is that
a court of competent jurisdiction—and in many states, a court
that specializes in child protective matters—must adjudicate
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

333. See Cavarretta v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 660 N.E.2d 250,
258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[T]he credible evidence standard is deficient because
it does not require the fact finder to weigh conflicting evidence. This is
especially unfair and unreliable in light of the nature of the testimony and the
need to compare and contrast different versions of the same event.”); Jamison
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. 2007) (“As the probable cause
standard does not require a balancing of available evidence, it leaves the
ultimate assessment ‘open to the subjective values’ of the fact finder, thereby
magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding.” (quoting Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982))).
334. See Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at 411–12 (determining that, while fiscal
and administrative efficiency are substantial state interests, the state’s
interest does not outweigh the liberty and property interests of the accused).
335. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 314–15
The most drastic avenue is to remove the child prior to going to
court—an action referred to as an “emergency removal.” Short of
removing the child on an emergency basis, the agency can file a
petition in the relevant court seeking an order placing the family
under supervision of the agency, or mandating that the parents
comply with certain services or conditions to keep their child at
home. The agency may seek the court’s approval to remove the child
or children from the home at that time.
336. See id. at 313–16 (discussing the ability of state agencies to determine
a course of action most beneficial to the child and to remedy abuse or neglect).
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precisely the same question that is asked of the substantiating
agency: has sufficient evidence been adduced to support the
allegations made against the parent?337 In an overwhelming
majority of states, the court will assess this question based on
the same burden of proof that the ALJ at a registry hearing
would use: preponderance of the evidence.338 There is reason to
believe that court-based findings may be more accurate than
administrative determinations. Judges often review a broader
array of evidence, and that evidence often must be presented in
accordance with the rules of evidence, which are geared toward
ensuring reliability.339 In recognition of this fact, numerous
states have written into their registry schemes a mechanism to
avoid duplicative adjudications: many states bar parents from
taking administrative appeals of their registry inclusion if a
court makes a finding against them.340 Yet too few state schemes
employ the reverse procedure, expunging reports when a court
does not find that abuse or neglect occurred.341 As a result, these
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

337. See id. at 316 (noting that “the court in many states will not yet have
ruled as to whether . . . the child actually was abused or neglected,” when
determining what intervention is appropriate, making that determination
later at a fact-finding hearing).
338. Compare, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2019)
(stating that in an administrative hearing, the Office of Children and Family
Services must prove abuse or neglect occurred based on a preponderance of
the evidence), with N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(b) (McKinney 2019) (“In a
fact-finding hearing: . . . any determination that the child is an abuse or
neglected child must be based on a preponderance of evidence . . . .”).
339. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a) (detailing the admissible forms
of evidence in a family court hearing). Judges who oversee child protective
proceedings everyday also have more expertise in interpreting the statutory
definitions of abuse and neglect than ALJs who often adjudicate a variety of
issues across agencies. See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums,
Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 (2002) (“Because ALJs
are part of an agency that possess specialized expertise, long time association
with a particular agency and its personnel tends to indoctrinate or inculcate
into the ALJ ‘the agency culture, viewpoints, and approaches to problems.’”
(quoting K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First
Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 95, 125 (1995))).
340. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(d)(11) (West 2019) (“The doctrines
of collateral estoppel and res judicata as applied in judicial proceedings shall
be applicable to the administrative hearings held pursuant to this article.”).
341. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-18-807 (West 2019) (permitting the
prevailing party in a judicial adjudication to file a certified copy of the judicial
adjudication to the Office of Appeals and Hearings and requiring the office to
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states force individuals to appeal their reports even when a
court already has found that no abuse or neglect occurred.342
States should automatically expunge a report from the
registry if a petition based on that report is dismissed in a court
of law. This scheme would mirror the automatic sealing of
records that is commonplace in criminal court. For example, in
New York, when a criminal action is resolved in favor of the
accused, the clerk of court immediately notifies the
commissioner of the Division of Criminal Justice Services and
other relevant agencies that the record, including the arrest
record, shall be sealed.343 Automatic sealing occurs not only with
acquittals after trial, but also when a defendant successfully
completes a plea agreement resulting in dismissal.344 The state’s
interest in forcing the parent to litigate their registry appeal

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

determine if the adjudication has preclusive effect “by applying the principles
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion”).
342. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Salcido, 567 S.W.3d 510, 515
(Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (dismissing an appeal by a parent for failure to report the
final disposition of the Office of Appeals and Hearings’ determination).
343. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2019) (requiring
expungement of records upon dismissal or election not to prosecute). This
process is automatic and if the District Attorney objects, the onus is on the
State to file a motion and demonstrate that the interests of justice require
otherwise.
See
id.
(“[U]nless
the
district
attorney
upon
motion . . . demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the interests of
justice require otherwise . . . .”).
344. See id. §160.50(3) (“No defendant shall be required or permitted to
waive eligibility for sealing or expungement pursuant to this section as part of
a plea of guilty . . . .”). Petitions can also be dismissed in court when the state
has decided that the parent has rectified any concerns in the home, generally
when the allegations are minor, and the parent has successfully completed
recommended services. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(c) (McKinney 2019)
(“If facts sufficient to sustain the petition under this article are not
established, or if, in a case of alleged neglect, the court concludes that its aid
is not required . . . the court shall dismiss the petition and shall state on the
record the grounds for the dismissal.” (emphasis added)). In the case of a
report where the alleged abuse or neglect did occur, but the family did services
and rectified the situation, the state may desire to retain the report for
diagnostic purposes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-311(b) (2019) (“This data
shall be furnished by county directors of social services to the Department of
Health and Human Services and shall be confidential . . . .”). For these
circumstances, the state could maintain a registry accessible only to child
welfare agencies. Id.
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after receiving a favorable disposition in a court of law is low.345
If Family Court has found no abuse or neglect occurred after an
adjudicatory hearing on the merits, the only result of requiring
a duplicative administrative procedure is waste.346
Automatic expungement is a practical cost-saving measure
for the state, reducing the number of administrative appeals
and hearings per year.347 States can adopt provisions that
provide for prompt expungement of reports if a petition arising
from the report has been dismissed by order of a court in a child
protective proceeding. Indiana and Hawaii have such
provisions, which can serve as a guide.348 Some states already
recognize court findings as presumptive evidence at the
administrative hearing, but stop short of automatic
expungement.349 This provision should include not only a
finding of no abuse or neglect after an adjudicatory hearing, but
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

345. As noted above, the state interest in lower evidentiary requirements
does not supersede the liberty and property interests of the parent. In the case
where the state could not substantiate the claims of abuse, the state’s interest
should be even lower. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
346. Given that a vast majority of hearings on expungement result in
reversal, automatic expungement for unsubstantiated claims would likely
remove a great majority of the judicial and administrative burden. See supra
notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
347. Without the expense of duplicative hearings, the states may partially
offset the expense of the greater number of hearings that results from
expanding the time frame for requests. See supra Part III.B.3.
348. See,
e.g.,
HAW.
REV.
STAT.
§ 350-2(d)
(2019)
(“The
department . . . shall promptly expunge the reports in cases if . . . (2) the
petition arising from the report has been dismissed by order of the family court
after an adjudicatory hearing on the merits pursuant to chapter 587A.”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-15(a) (West 2020) (“The Department shall expunge a
substantiated report contained within the index not later than ten (10)
working days after any of the following occurs: (1) a court having jurisdiction
over a child in need of services proceeding determines that child abuse or
neglect has not occurred . . . .”).
349. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.10(f) (McKinney
2019) (“A Family Court finding . . . that a child has been abused or neglected
is presumptive evidence that the report of child abuse and maltreatment
maintained by the [state registry] concerning such child is substantiated by a
fair preponderance of the evidence if the allegations are the same.”); see also
Mich. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (Apr. 28, 1978), 1978 Mich. AG LEXIS 126
(“The obverse of this statement is therefore equally true; that is, a finding by
a court of competent jurisdiction that there was no neglect or abuse raises a
presumption that the report or record was not substantiated and must
therefore, be amended or expunged.”).
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also any dispositions or settlements that result in a dismissal of
the petition.350
IV. Conclusion
The right to family integrity is fundamental. When
individuals are included in statewide registries purporting to
compile allegations of child maltreatment, this right is
infringed. By focusing on employment consequences of registry
inclusion and ignoring the impacts on individuals’ right to
parent, current jurisprudence and scholarship sets the due
process scale to the wrong balance. This Article demonstrates
that the balance must tip in order to protect families, and has
suggested a number of common-sense reforms that, if
implemented, will serve to protect families and lead to better
outcomes for children.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

350. For example, in New York, many cases do not proceed to fact-finding
but the petition is dismissed. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(c) (McKinney 2019)
(“If facts sufficient to sustain the petition under this article are not
established, or if, in a case of alleged neglect, the court concludes that its aid
is not required . . ., the court shall dismiss the petition and shall state on the
record the grounds for the dismissal.”). Many other cases do not proceed after
successful completion of a suspended judgement. See id. § 1053 (permitting
the court to “define permissible terms and conditions” for allowing a
suspended judgment for up to one year in most cases). Similarly, the court has
the power to vacate a finding. See id. § 1061 (“For good cause shown and after
due notice, the court on its own motion . . . may . . . vacate any order issued in
the course of a proceeding under this article.”).

